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I. INTRODUCTION
A new arena inviting collaboration between the law and sciences has
emerged in criminal justice. The nation's economic struggles and its record-
breaking rate of incarceration have encouraged policymakers to embrace a
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new penology which seeks to simultaneously curb prison populations, reduce
recidivism, and improve public safety.' The new penology draws upon the
behavioral sciences for techniques to identify and classify individuals based
on their potential future risk and for current best evidence to inform decisions
on how to manage offender populations accordingly.2 Empirically driven
practices have been utilized in many criminal justice contexts for years, yet
have historically remained "a largely untapped resource" in sentencing
decisions.3 One reason is that sentencing law in America has for some time
been largely driven by retributive theories. 4 The new penology clearly
incorporates utilitarian goals and welcomes an interdisciplinary approach to
meet them.
As criminal justice officials seek more cost-effective solutions to criminal
offending, demand for evidence-based5  sentencing has intensified.6
Evidence-based sentencing practices have recently adopted data-driven risk
assessment tools to predict recidivism. A central idea is that accurate
information on risk can inform decisions to reserve prison resources for high
risk offenders, while reducing recidivism of low risk defendants by diverting
them to less costly, community-based sanctions. Indeed, risk assessment
stands at the "leading edge of the next wave of [sentencing] reform" and is
considered the "next frontier" in modem sentencing law.7 At least a majority
of states currently use risk-based assessments in their sentencing systems.'
1. Juliene James et al., A View from the States: Evidence-Based Public Safety Legislation,
102 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 821, 823 (2012); Michael A. Simons, Sense and Sentencing: Our
Imprisonment Epidemic, 25 J. C.R. & ECON. DEV. 153, 166 (2010).
2. Malcolm M. Feeley & Jonathan Simon, The New Penology: Notes on the Emerging
Strategy of Corrections and Its Implications, 30 CRIMINOLOGY 449, 452 (1992).
3. Jordan M. Hyatt et al., Reform in Motion: The Promise and Perils of Incorporating Risk
Assessments and Cost-Benefit Analysis into Pennsylvania Sentencing, 49 DUQ. L. REv. 707, 714
(2011) [hereinafter Hyatt, Reform].
4. See generally Gerard V. Bradley, Retribution and Overcriminalization, HERITAGE
FOUND. (Mar. 1, 2012), http://thf media.s3.amazonaws.com/2012/pdf/m77.pdf.
5. Stephen Hart, Evidence-BasedAssessment ofRisk for Sexual Violence, 1 CHAP. J. CRIM.
JUST. 143, 146 (2009) ("Evidence-based means an action or decision that was guided by, based
on, or made after consulting a systematic review of relevant information in the form of
observation, research, statistics, or well-validated theory.").
6. Hyatt, Reform, supra note 3, at 714; see also J. Richard Couzens, Realignment and
Evidence-Based Practice: A New Era in Sentencing California Felonies, 25 FED. SENT'G REP.
217 (2013) (noting number of counties in California (2010-2011) adopting some form of
evidence-based sentencing practices increased nearly 33%); Simons, supra note 1, at 166
(recognizing states moving from punishment to reducing recidivism).
7. Hyatt, Reform, supra note 3, at 733; see also Roger K. Warren, Evidence-Based
Sentencing: Are We Up to the Task?, 23 FED. SENT'G REP. 153, 157 (2010) (labeling evidence-
based sentencing the "new frontier").
8. Shawn Bushway & Jeffrey Smith, Sentencing Using Statistical Treatment Rules: What
We Don't Know Can Hurt Us, 23 J. QUANTITATIVE CRIMINOLOGY 377, 378 (2007).
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The science of risk prediction continues to progress. Stakeholders now
promote as best practices in evidence-based sentencing jurisdictions the use
of actuarial risk assessment tools, particularly in preference to unstructured
clinical judgments of future dangerousness. Actuarial tools guide evaluators
through a regimented process in which they use existing data to score factors
associated with recidivism, provide the given weights, and then extract an
estimated probability of reoffending. 9 A New York Times article describes the
practice as "sentencing by numbers," in which the decision-maker is meant
to sentence "offenders the way insurance agents write policies, based on a
short list of factors with a proven relationship to future risk."' 0 In sum, risk
prediction is shaping sentencing philosophies, with technological risk
instruments entrenched in decisions about punishment."l
While evidence-based sentencing practices led by actuarial risk
instruments are gaining widespread approval, critical questions must be
raised. Empirically derived and mathematically refined actuarial predictions
appear to embody a desirable and progressive policy reform. Actuarial
models are praised for being objective, reliable, logical, and quantifiable. 2
However, law and justice have suffered too many unfortunate experiences
with purportedly scientific evidence which only later was revealed to be no
less than junk science."' The purpose of this Article is to address the use of
"actuarial justice" in sentencing decisions and to question whether reliance
upon even "best practices" is justified. Sentencing and punishment, on the
one hand, are considered crucial decisions to protect public safety while, on
the other hand, they necessarily involve significant infringements upon such
individual rights as liberty and privacy. If officials have misplaced their trust
in the actuarial model, injustice may have invaded sentencing regimes.
This Article is concerned with the influence of actuarial risk tools in
sentencing decisions generally. There are now dozens of actuarial tools
available, some of which are applied across the board, while others are
designed for specific types of offenders or crimes or for other more discrete
9. Kelly Hannah-Moffat, Actuarial Sentencing: An "Unsettled" Proposition, 30 JUST. Q.
270, 271 (2013) ("Actuarial risk tools guide practitioners through a logical and simple process to
itemize, score, and interpret information about offenders.").
10. Emily Bazelon, Sentencing by the Numbers, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 2, 2005, (MAGAZINE), at
18.
11. BERNARD E. HARCOURT, AGAINST PREDICTION: PROFILING, POLICING, AND PUNISHING
'N AN ACTUARIAL AGE 188 (2007).
12. See infra notes 63-70 and accompanying text.
13. See generally Erica Beecher-Monas, Blinded by Science: How Judges Avoid the Science
in Scientific Evidence, 71 TEMP. L. REV. 55 (1998).
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segments of society.1 4 Thus, in order to delve into more detail about the
purported scientific properties and realistic abilities of actuarial sentencing,
this Article will eventually focus upon the risk assessment tools targeting
those offenders for which public safety concerns are paramount: violent and
sexual offenders.
The Article proceeds as follows. Section II introduces the ideas and
purposes underlying evidence-based practices. Models of actuarial risk
assessments are presented and how they are employed in evidence-based
sentencing is demonstrated. Section III outlines a host of evidentiary,
empirical, and pragmatic issues with these actuarial tools in sentencing
matters. Actuarial risk focuses almost exclusively on the proportionate
likelihood of recidivism, without providing data concerning other important
dimensions of risk, such as imminence, duration, type of recidivism, or
severity of harm. The very limited nature of information provided renders
actuarial risk results as insufficiently relevant to assist in any factual question
in sentencing matters. A host of statistical measures are presented, and new
statistics computed and offered herein, to show that the predictive ability of
actuarial tools is rather weak, and high error rates are a consequence thereof.
In addition, the popular actuarial risk instruments are not generalizable to
routine sentencing populations in the United States. The contention herein is
that, altogether, actuarial risk models fail to meet the high standards of
validity and reliability for admissibility in the law as expert evidence. From
a practical perspective, actuarial models are problematic as well, in that they
use group-based statistics, which cannot for empirical reasons be directly
used for individual predictions of risk. Section IV then responds to the
argument that actuarial results ought to be admissible as just one piece of data
in a decision-making process in which an array of information is considered.
It is questionable whether many evaluators are sufficiently knowledgeable
about actuarial risk methodologies to qualify as expert witnesses in the first
place. Further, this Article maintains that actuarial predictions are overly
prejudicial, confusing, and misleading, and therefore judges ought to act as
gatekeepers for the law to exclude or substantively limit actuarial risk results
as evidence in sentencing proceedings.
14. Jay P. Singh et al., A Comparative Study of Violence Risk Assessment Tools: A
Systematic Review and Metaregression Analysis of 68 Studies Involving 25,980 Participants, 31
CLINICAL PSYCHOL. REV. 499, 500 (2011) [hereinafter Singh et al., Metaregression].
[Ariz. St. L.J.
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II. EVIDENCE-BASED SENTENCING: THE REIGN OF ACTUARIAL RISK
ASSESSMENTS
A new penology has emerged in which criminal justice officials are
loosening the grip of retributive ideologies by embracing utilitarian
objectives as well. The sine qua non of the new penology is risk. 5 The idea
is to harness the ability to differentiate among offenders based on their
likelihood of future recidivism. The assessment of risk hopefully informs
utilitarian judgments to more strategically use incarceration, to craft
appropriate rehabilitative programming, and to otherwise manage offender
populations presently and in the future. Courts and correctional authorities
are increasingly using risk estimates for a variety of reasons, including
decisions on pretrial release, conditions of probation, parole, civil
commitment, and sentencing.1 6 The sentencing decision is likely the most
critical legal event, comparatively, as it is explicitly intended to be punitive
in nature, is meant as an indication of community condemnation for criminal
culpability, and it enjoys greater substantive and procedural processes. Thus,
even if risk assessment tools are appropriate for use in decisions regarding
bail, probation and parole, and civil commitment, their use in sentencing may
be a different matter entirely from perspectives of law and justice.
A. The Allure of Evidence-Based Practices
The new penology's goals of curtailing prison populations, reducing
recidivism, and protecting the public require a balancing act at times.
Officials wish to identify offenders who can properly be diverted from prison
either because they pose little threat or seem good candidates for
rehabilitation in community-based programs. 7 Reducing reliance on
imprisonment makes fiscal sense as community corrections options are far
less costly than prison. 8 Still, several proponents assert that evidence-based
sentencing is appropriate not only to potentially divert low risk defendants
from prison. Risk judgments can also assist decisions in the reverse, e.g., for
15. Hazel Kemshall, Crime and Risk, in RISK IN SOCIAL SCIENCE 76, 77 (Peter Taylor-
Goodby & Jens 0. Zinn eds., 2006).
16. PEW CTR. ON THE STATES, RIsK/NEEDS ASSESSMENT 101: SCIENCE REVEALS NEW
TOOLS TO MANAGE OFFENDERS 2 (2011), available at
http://www.pewtrusts.org/-/media/legacy/uploadedfiles/pcsassets/20 11 /PewRiskAssessmentbr
iefpdf.pdf.
17. Melissa Hamilton, Prison-by-Default: Challenging the Federal Sentencing Policy's
Presumption ofIncarceration, 51 Hous. L. REV. 1271, 1284-85 (2014).
18. John Stuart & Robert Sykora, Minnesota's Failed Experience with Sentencing
Guidelines and the Future of Evidence-Based Sentencing, 37 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 426, 461
(2011).
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the strategic use of preventive incapacitation for those at highest risk of
recidivism. 9 Sentencing also involves proportionality. Optimistically, risk-
oriented practices can help prevent judges or juries from over punishing by
sending low risk individuals to prison as well as from under punishing by
issuing community sanctions to high risk defendants.20
There is little doubt that judgments on future dangerousness have been a
part of the decision-making process in sentencing for a long time, even in
mainly retributive jurisdictions. Its role had been more casual and often
mysterious.
Informally, sentencing judges have long assessed risk of re-offense
in crafting a defendant's sentence. Sometimes, the consideration of
risk happened through evaluation of a defendant's prior criminal
record, whether as part of a fully discretionary decision or as part of
a guidelines system that includes enhanced recommended
punishments for repeat offenders. Other times, judges relied on their
own intuition, instinct and sense of justice to impose more severe
sentences upon offenders whom they, based on their frequently
unspoken clinical prediction, believed presented an enhanced risk
to the public in the future."z
Such an unstructured and unregulated method of predicting risk can be
unpalatable. Punishment may as a result be viewed as merely representing
idiosyncratic, biased, and unreliable preferences of individual judges.
In lieu thereof, the philosophy of evidence-based sentencing embraces the
utilization of scientifically derived information and structured methods to
assess risk. Evidence-based sentencing is now promoted by judges,
legislatures, and policy groups.22 On behalf of the judiciary, a direct
contributor to the emergence of evidence-based practices was a joint project
sponsored by the National Center for State Courts, the National Judicial
College, and the Crime and Justice Institute which created and publicly
promotes a curriculum to educate sentencing judges nationwide about the
benefits of considering factors that have been empirically validated as being
19. See, e.g., Jordan M. Hyatt et al., Follow the Evidence: Integrate Risk Assessment Into
Sentencing, 23 FED. SEN'G REP. 266, 266 (2011) [hereinafter Hyatt, Integrate]; Hyatt, Reform,
supra note 3, at 735; Michael Marcus, MPC-The Root of the Problem: Just Deserts and Risk
Assessment, 61 FLA. L. REV. 751, 771 (2009).
20. Hannah-Moffat, supra note 9, at 271.
21. Hyatt, Reform, supra note 3, at 724-25.
22. Memorandum from Vera Inst. of Justice to Del. Justice Reinvestment Task Force 9-10
(Oct. 12, 2011), available at
http://ltgov.delaware.gov/taskforces/djrtf/DJRTFRisk AssessmentMemo.pdf.
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either criminogenic or protective.23 Judges in many states are also formally
advancing evidence-based sentencing. The Conference of Chief Justices,
representing the highest state judicial officers, passed a resolution supporting
"efforts to adopt sentencing and correctional policies and programs based on
the best research evidence of practices shown to be effective in reducing
recidivism."24 In addition, Utah's Judicial Council publicly supports the use
of evidence-based practices,25 while the supreme courts of Arizona and Idaho
ordered probation offices in their states to specifically focus on identifying
strengths and needs in presentence reports.26
Still, judges are not necessarily acting on their own in embracing what are
perceived as reformist innovations in sentencing practices. Evidence-based
sentencing has succeeded in introducing substantive change in many
jurisdictions through the unique combination of "multidisciplinary input,
bipartisan cooperation, the availability of data analysis and information, and
the political leadership on all fronts."27 Commentators have observed,
thereby, that risk assessment has recently experienced a "remarkable
resurgence,"" a "growing interest,"2 9 and is now "widely hailed" as a
progressive reform in criminal sanctioning.30
Evidence-based sentencing practices have rapidly evolved. The
nomenclature itself has changed from an ideology of "future dangerousness"
as an expansive and nebulous concept to a more refined perspective of "risk
assessment."31 This evolution has mirrored the progression in the forensic
23. NAT'L CTR. FOR STATE COURTS, EVIDENCE-BASED SENTENCING TO IMPROVE PUBLIC
SAFETY & REDUCE RECIDIVISM: A MODEL CURRICULUM FOR JUDGES 1 (2009), available at
http://cdm 16501 .contentdm.oclc.org/cdm/ref/collection/criminal/id/185.
24. Conference of Chief Justices Bd. of Dirs. & Conference of State Court Adm'rs Policy
& Liaison Comm., Resolution 12 in Support of Sentencing Practices that Promote Public Safety
and Reduce Recidivism, NAT'L CTR. FOR STATE COURTS (Aug. 1, 2007),
http://www.ncsc.org/-/media/Microsites/Files/CSl/Resolution- 12.ashx.
25. Utah Judicial Council, Judicial Council Meeting Minutes, at 4 (2009), available at
http://www.utcourts.gov/admin/judcncl/min-2009/min07-09.pdf.
26. Admin. Order No. 2009-01: Budget Reductions in the Judicial Branch of Arizona, ARIZ.
SUPREME COURT (2009), http://www.azcourts.gov/portals/22/admorder/ordersO9/2009-Ol.pdf,
IDAHO STATE JUDICIARY, 2011 ANNUAL REPORT 7 (2011), available at
http://www.isc.idaho.gov/annuals/2011/201 lAnnualReport.pdf.
27. James et al., supra note 1, at 848.
28. John Monahan & Jennifer L. Skeem, Risk Redux: The Resurgence of Risk Assessment
in Criminal Sanctioning, 26 FED. SENT'G REP. 158, 158 (2014).
29. J.C. Oleson, Risk in Sentencing: Constitutionally Suspect Variables and Evidence-
Based Sentencing, 64 SMU L. REV. 1329, 1336 (2011).
30. Sonja B. Starr, Evidence-Based Sentencing and the Scientific Rationalization of
Discrimination, 66 STAN. L. REV. 803, 805 (2014).
31. KIRK HEILBRUN, EVALUATION FOR RISK OF VIOLENCE IN ADULTS 14 (Thomas Grisso et
al. eds., 2009).
47:0001]
ARIZONA STATE LAW JOURNAL
sciences involving methodologies for estimating recidivism risk.32
Previously, forensic evaluations involving future predictions of antisocial
behavior existed in the form of unstructured professional judgments,
generally conducted by mental health clinicians.33 The process of
unstructured professional opinions is aptly summarized as follows:
Clinical judgments about dangerousness might incorporate aspects
of the professionals' knowledge, personal experience, "gut"
feelings and other intuitions, and whatever other information about
the situation that seems relevant to the problem. This process is
called "clinical" because it mimics how physicians arrive at
judgments about their patients' diagnoses and treatments: doctors
interview and examine patients, think about what is probably going
wrong, and then suggest what patients should do and prescribe
treatments.34
While clinical judgments of risk present the advantage of being offered by
(hopefully) impartial, educated, and experienced professionals, the potential
for unconscious bias, unreliability, and lack of transparency remains.35 The
field of mental health risk assessment recognized these issues and, as
scientists are wont to do, continues to work toward advancing knowledge
about recidivism risk factors and on improving the accuracy of their risk
methodologies. 36  As a result, over time, reliance upon unstructured
professional opinion has yielded to structured professional judgment, which
itself has generally been supplanted by actuarial risk assessments. 37 Thus,
32. George Szmukler & Nikolas Rose, Risk Assessment in Mental Health Care: Values and
Costs, 31 BEHAV. SCi. & L. 125, 131 (2013) ("What was conceptualized as a phenomenon that,
unlike 'dangerousness,' was not a fixed quality of an individual, but dependent on the co-presence
of many factors, including those external and those subject to change, tends to become, in effect,
an objective, calculable, and static measure of risk attached to an individual.").
33. Gina M. Vincent et al., The Use of Actuarial Risk Assessment Instruments in Sex
Offenders, in SEX OFFENDERS: IDENTIFICATION, RISK ASSESSMENT, TREATMENT, AND LEGAL
ISSUES 70, 70 (Fabian M. Saleh et al. eds., 2009).
34. Douglas Mossman, Evaluating Risk Assessments Using Receiver Operating
Characteristic Analysis: Rationale, Advantages, Insights, and Limitations, 31 BEHAV. Sci. & L.
23, 33 (2013).
35. Melissa Hamilton, Public Safety, Individual Liberty, and Suspect Science: Future
Dangerousness Assessments and Sex Offender Laws, 83 TEMP. L. REv. 697, 744-49 (2011);
Jennifer L. Lanterman et al., Sex Offender Risk Assessment, Sources of Variation, and The
Implications of Misuse, 41 CRIM. JUST. & BEHAV. 822, 834 (2014).
36. Richard E. Redding, Evidence-Based Sentencing: The Science of Sentencing Policy and
Practice, I CHAP. J. CRIM. JUST. 1, 4 (2009).
37. Jeffrey C. Singer et al., A Convergent Approach to Sex Offender Risk Assessment, in
THE WILEY-BLACKWELL HANDBOOK OF LEGAL AND ETHICAL ASPECTS OF SEX OFFENDER
TREATMENT AND MANAGEMENT 341, 341 (Karen Harrison & Bernadette Rainey eds., 2013);
Thomas Nilsson et al., The Precarious Practice of Forensic Psychiatric Risk Assessments, 32
[Ariz. St. L.J.
AD VENTURES IN RISK
evidence-based sentencing practices are no longer as concerned with
educating decisionmakers about which characteristics or circumstances have
been empirically found to be correlative or causative of either future violence
or desistance from crime; instead, evidence-based sentencing is now mostly
about ascertaining the numerical scores and rankings produced by actuarial
tools. In other words, "actuarial sentencing" may now be the appropriate label
for contemporary sentencing law and praxis.
1. Modeling Actuarial Risk
Actuarial risk tools basically rely upon aggregate statistics derived from
historical experience. Actuarial tool creators study the statistical relationships
between a host of variables and the risk outcome of interest using data from
available samples, often referred to as developmental or normed samples.
Researchers often select the stronger predictors to include in the final
actuarial model. Appropriate weights often apply to to provide additional
points to those factors found to offer greater predictive value than others.3" A
table of estimated probabilities of the outcome occurring is created to match
to final scores. This is called an "experience table" since it is based on the
observed rates of the outcome of interest from the developmental samples.
The experience table might, for example, convey that of the subjects in the
developmental sample who were assigned a score of six, 35% were observed
to have recidivated.
In sum, the developers of actuarial instruments use existing data in an
empirical way to create rules that combine highly relevant factors, provide
applicable weights, create final mechanistic scores, and provide an
experience table of estimated probabilities of the outcome, all based on the
development sample data.39 Developers of actuarial risk tools at times pool
INT'L J.L. & PSYCHIATRY 400, 402 (2009) ("Instead of categorical assessments of
'dangerousness', the 'risk' of violence was measured as the proportion of individuals who
relapsed or committed a certain type of crime in a (hypothetical) group sharing similar rating
scores on structured or semi-structured rating scales, or 'instruments."').
38. Actuarial models presume multiple factors produce a better predictive tool than a few.
Joanna Amirault & Patrick Lussier, Population Heterogeneity, State Dependence and Sexual
Offender Recidivism: The Aging Process and the Lost Predictive Impact of Prior Criminal
Charges over Time, 39 J. CRIM. JUST. 344, 344 (2011).
39. Jennifer L. Skeem & John Monahan, Current Directions in Violence Risk Assessment,
20 CURRENT DIRECTIONS IN PSYCHOL. SCi. 38, 39 (2011) (synthesizing process: "(a) identifying
empirically valid risk factors, (b) determining a method for measuring (or 'scoring') these risk
factors, (c) establishing a procedure for combining scores on the risk factors, and (d) producing
an estimate of violence risk").
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together risk groupings, referred to as risk bins, based on point totals.4" As an
illustration, a risk bin might pool together scores 10-15, yielding a single risk
probability estimate. Sometimes, too, the instruments place a categorical
label on a risk bin, such as the scores of 10-15 representing "moderate risk"
or perhaps "high risk."
An evaluator using an actuarial risk instrument so conceived begins by
scoring the various factors contained in the model. The evaluator then applies
the given weights and calculates a total score. The following demonstrates a
hypothesized next step involving a sexual recidivism predictive tool:
This score translates typically into a risk category, where
individuals who score positively on a number of items obtain scores
placing them in a high-risk group, those who score on some items
are placed in a medium-risk group, while those who score on only
a few items are placed typically in a low-risk group. In most cases,
the scale developers have compiled 'experience tables' from
retrospective studies of released sex offenders that indicate a
prediction of future risk, based on the percentage of offenders in
each risk category who have recidivated. Hence, a value of 45%
might be extracted for a high-risk individual over a 10-year period,
which means that individuals with similar characteristics (45 in
100) re-offended within this time-period.41
2. Actuarial Risk in Sentencing
Across the country, reliance specifically upon actuarial risk assessments
in sentencing is spreading.42 Numerous policy institutes advocate they be
used routinely.43 The Pew Center not only promotes actuarial tools, it
advocates that their data outputs anchor sentencing determinations. 44
40. Jay P. Singh et al,, Measurement of Predictive Validity in Violence Risk Assessment
Studies: A Second-Order Systematic Review, 31 BEHAV. Sci. & L. 55, 57 (2013) [hereinafter
Singh et al., Systematic Review] ("In the prediction-focused actuarial approach, weighted scores
are assigned to criminal history, sociodemographic, and/or clinical factors empirically associated
with the likelihood of antisocial behavior. These weighted scores are used to classify individuals
into risk bins that correspond to probabilistic estimates of future antisocial behavior.").
41. Learn A. Craig & Anthony Beech, Best Practice in Conducting Actuarial Risk
Assessments with Adult Sexual Offenders, 15 J. SEXUAL AGGRESSION 193, 197 (2009).
42. David E. Patton, Guns, Crime Control, and a Systemic Approach to Federal Sentencing,
32 CARDOZO L. REV. 1427, 1455 (2011) (conceptualizing actuarial risk as "becom[ing]
increasingly popular" across sentencing courts).
43. NAT'L CTR. FOR STATE COURTS, EVIDENCE-BASED SENTENCING TO IMPROVE PUBLIC
SAFETY AND REDUCE RECIDIVISM: A MODEL CURRICULUM FOR JUDGES 1 (2005), available at
http://cdml 6501 .contentdm.oclc.org/cdm/ref/collection/criminal/id/185.
44. PEW CTR. ON THE STATES, RISK/NEEDS ASSESSMENT 101: SCIENCE REVEALS NEW
TOOLS TO HELP MANAGE OFFENDERS 5 (2011), available at
[Ariz. St. L.J.
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Multiple state legislatures have likewise become convinced, encouraging-
even mandating in some jurisdictions-the use of actuarial risk assessments
to inform sentencing decisions. By statute, for example, Pennsylvania,4
Tennessee,46 and Alabama47 require the use of validated risk assessment tools
in sentencing proceedings. The State of Washington by law permits a judge
to order a presentence risk assessment and for her to have access to the results
for sentencing.48 Vermont 49 and Kentucky" also target the specific use of sex
offense recidivism risk tools for defendants convicted of sexual crimes by
statute.
The State of Virginia is perhaps the most blatant in incorporating actuarial
risk tools into sentencing. Virginia law mandates the creation and use of an
actuarial risk tool to identify nonviolent, low-risk offenders specifically for
the purpose of diversion from prison.51 Another Virginia statute requires the
use of a risk instrument tool concentrating on sex offenders, though for a
contrasting function: actuarial results indicating higher probabilities of
recidivism risk trigger gradated increases in recommended sentences.12 At its
extreme, the Virginia scheme raises the upper end of the sentencing range by
300% with the highest actuarial scores.
In practice, a number of states' probation departments (including
California, Colorado, and Washington) have incorporated actuarial tools into
presentence investigation routines.53 In some cases, the actuarial tool is
expected to weigh heavily in the adjudicative process. In New York, for
example, probation officers are required to use an actuarial scale to assess
http://www.pewtrusts.org/-/media/legacy/uploadedfiles/pcsassets/201 1/PewRiskAssessmentbr
iefpdf.pdf.
45. 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 2154.5(a)(6) (2009).
46. TENN. CODE ANN. § 41-1-412(b) (2013).
47. ALA. CODE § 12-25-33(6) (2013).
48. WASH. REV. CODE § 9.94A.500(1) (2013).
49. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 28, § 204a(b)(1) (2013).
50. KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 17.554(2) (West 2013).
51. Hyatt, Reform, supra note 3, at 723.
52. Id. at 723.
53. JESSIKA SHIPLEY, COLO. LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL STAFF, ISSUE BRIEF No. 12-38,
PROBATION SERVICES IN COLORADO 1 (2012), available at
http://www.colorado.gov/cs/Satellite?c=DocumentC&childpagename=CGA-Legislative
Council%2FDocument C%2FCLCAddLink&cid=1251634174919&pagename=CLCWrapper;
WASH. STATE INST. FOR PUB. POLICY, RISK ASSESSMENT INSTRUMENTS TO PREDICT RECIDIVISM
OF SEX OFFENDERS: PRACTICES IN WASHINGTON STATE 2 (2008), available at
http://www.wsipp.wa.gov/ReportFile/ 01 5/WsippRisk-Assessment-Instruments-to-Predict-
Recidivism-of-Sex-Offenders-Practices-in-Washington-StateFull-Report.pdf (discussing
actuarial tool for sex offenders); CAL. SARATSO REVIEW & TRAINING COMMS., SEX OFFENDER
RISK ASSESSMENT IN CALIFORNIA (2012), available at
saratso.org/docs/RA_summaryforjudgesattys-rev3_061611 .docx (same).
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recidivism for sex offenders and the result should "anchor the judgment or
impressions. 5 4 The proffer of actuarial results is clearly not one sided. Case
law represents that actuarial predictions of risk are commonly being
introduced in sentencing proceedings by various players: prosecution
experts,55  defense experts,56  and probation officers in presentence
investigation reports.57
The strong momentum for incorporating actuarial tool results in
sentencing practices likely will continue in the future. The influential Model
Penal Code was recently revised and it now explicitly addresses evidence-
based practices in sentencing. The model legislation envisions a sentencing
commission to be instructed as follows:
The commission shall develop actuarial instruments or processes,
supported by current and ongoing recidivism research, that will
estimate the relative risks that individual offenders pose to public
safety through their future criminal conduct. When these
instruments or processes prove sufficiently reliable, the commission
may incorporate them into the sentencing guidelines.58
The revised Model Penal Code anticipates that actuarial risk assessment will
serve as a "regular part of the felony sentencing process."59
The preference for actuarial-based predictions of risk as the new form of
evidence-based sentencing is largely explained by their guise of empiricism
and science.60 Sentencing experts and judges seem to elevate actuarial
54. N.Y. STATE Div. OF PROB. & CORR. ALTS., NEW YORK STATE PROBATION SEX
OFFENDER MANAGEMENT PRACTITIONER GUIDANCE 9 (2009), available at
dpca.state.ny.us/pdfs/sompractitionerguidanceluly2009.pdf
55. E.g., United States v. Zobel, 696 F.3d 558, 565 (6th Cir. 2012); United States v. Ellis,
68 M.J. 341, 343 (A.F. Ct. Crim. App. 2010); Artrip v. State, No. 07-01-0201-CR, 2002 Tex.
App. LEXIS 1267, at *12 (Tex. Crim. App. Feb. 20, 2002).
56. E.g., State v. Seward, 217 P.3d 443, 445 (Kan. 2009); Wilhite v. State, 339 S.W.3d 573,
575 (Mo. Ct. App. 2011); State v. Wilson, No. 2013AP415-C, 2013 Wis. App. LEXIS 953, at
*34 (Wis. Ct. App. Nov. 13, 2013); Brief of Appellant at *7, *10, United States v. Coffey, No.
12-5050, 2012 WL 1268077 (6th Cir. Apr. 6, 2012); Brief of Appellant at *8, United States v.
Guntharp, No. 10-4595, 2010 WL 4084584 (4th Cir. Oct. 18, 2010).
57. E.g., Harral v. Martel, No. EDCVIO-1379-AG(PLA), 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 47675, at
"19-20 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 22, 2011); People v. Godoy, No. B214003, 2011 Cal. App. Unpub.
LEXIS 2045, at *7 (Cal. Ct. App. Mar. 21,2011); People v. Hillier, 392 111. App. 3d 66,68 (2009);
State v. Winters, No. 5-113/04-0575, 2005 Iowa App. LEXIS 147, at * 2-3 (Iowa Ct. App. Feb.
24, 2005).
58. MODEL PENAL CODE: SENTENCING § 6B.09(2) (Tentative Draft No. 2, 2011), available
at http://www.ali.org/00021333/Model%2OPenal%2OCode%20TD%2ONo%202%20-
%20online%20version.pdf.
59. Id. at cmt. a.
60. Hyatt, Reform, supra note 3, at 725 ("Risk assessment tools now under consideration
are more transparent, rely on data, and attempt to regularize this instinct and subject it to more
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estimates over unstructured professional opinions because the former is
conjectured to reduce clinical error.61 Proponents also favor actuarial tools
over probation officers' speculations in presentence reports about future
dangerousness.62
Actuarial risk in sentencing has been lauded for being transparent,63
mathematical, 64 and logical.65 "There is a seductive quality to risk assessment:
it appears to bring the future into the present and to make it calculable. 66
Statistical calculations of risk have been conceptualized as providing an
important foundation for offering consistency in predictions, 67 standardizing
sentencing, 68 and "representing hope for a new age of scientifically guided
sentencing.69 In the actuarial model of sentencing, potentially subjective
verbal justifications for individual sentences are replaced with (seemingly)
more objective statistical measures; on the whole, words yield to numbers.7"
Whereas sentencing outcomes in general often draw complaints of
opacity, bias, and disparity, defenders of transparency, fairness, and justice
scientifically rigorous examinations. Ensuring uniform application and the unbiased use of
available data, these modem predictive tools are facilitated by the use of 'structured, empirically-
driven and theoretically driven' instruments."); Redding, supra note 36, at 4 (quoting Kirk
Heilbrun et al., Risk-Assessment in Evidence-Based Sentencing: Context and Promising Uses, 1
CHAP. J. CRIM. JUST. 127, 133 (2009)) ("Actuarial assessment is 'a formal method . . . [that
provides] a probability, or expected value, of some outcome. It uses empirical research to relate
numerical predictor variables to numerical outcomes. The sine qua non of actuarial assessment
involves using an objective, mechanistic, reproducible combination of predictive factors, selected
and validated through empirical research, against known outcomes that have also been
quantified."'); Ruth J. Tully et al., A Systematic Review on the Effectiveness of Sex Offender Risk
Assessment Tools in Predicting Sexual Recidivism of Adult Male Sex Offenders, 33 CLINICAL
PSYCHOL. REV. 287, 288 (2013).
61. Oleson, supra note 29, at 1336; Tully et al., supra note 60, at 288; Roger K. Warren,
Evidence-Based Sentencing: The Application of Principles of Evidence-Based Practice to State
Sentencing Practice andPolicy, 43 U.S.F. L. REV. 585, 603 (2009); Michael A. Wolff, Evidence-
Based Judicial Discretion: Promoting Public Safety Through State Sentencing Reform, 83 N.Y.U.
L. REV. 1389, 1406 (2008).
62. Jennifer Skeem, Risk Technology in Sentencing: Testing the Promises and Perils, 30
JUST. Q. 297, 300 (2013).
63. Id.; Hyatt, Reform, supra note 3, at 729; Tully et al., supra note 60, at 288.
64. M. Roffey & S.Z. Kaliski, To Predict or not to Predict-That is the Question, 15 AFR.
J. PSYCHIATRY 227, 227 (2012).
65. Id. at 227 (conceptualizing actuarial risk "rooted in careful data collection, logical
analysis and mathematical [rigor]").
66. George Szmukler & Nikolas Rose, Risk Assessment in Mental Health Care: Values and
Costs, 31 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 125, 131 (2013).
67. Skeem, supra note 62, at 300.
68. Hyatt, Integrate, supra note 19; Tully et al., supra note 60, at 288.
69. Starr, supra note 30, at 2; see also Warren, supra note 61, at 631 (actuarial risk tools
fosters "data-driven sentencing decisions").
70. Rasmus H. Wandall, Actuarial Risk Assessment. The Loss of Recognition of the
Individual Offender, 5 L. PROBABILITY & RISK 175, 187-89 (2006).
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may aggrandize the seeming objectivity of sentences founded upon putatively
impartial risk tools.71 The preference is not just oriented toward quantifiable
objectivity; potential ethical and normative benefits have been observed.
Actuarial-based punishments may convey greater "moral certainty and
legitimacy" than individual predilections and idiosyncratic judgments of
individual decisionmakers.72
Largely as a result of the acceptance in the law of actuarial models to help
inform various legal decisions (including in sentencing proceedings as just
described), a cottage industry of actuarial tool developers and forensic
evaluators has arisen and flourished. 3 The two most popular actuarial tools
to be used in recent years for violent and sexual recidivism are outlined next.
B. Popular Actuarial Tools for Violent and Sexual Recidivism
The Violence Risk Appraisal Guide ("VRAG") is the best known actuarial
tool for violence risk assessment 74 and the most researched in terms of
replication and cross-validation.75 VRAG was developed on samples of
juvenile and adult patients released from a single maximum security
psychiatric hospital in Canada.76 The incidence of mental illness in the
developmental samples is noteworthy. A significant proportion had been
found not guilty by reason of insanity and many tested as psychotic.77 Table
1 comprises the instrument's scoring sheet to illustrate the factors used and
the weights they carry.
71. Hyatt, Reform, supra note 3, at 729 ("The inclusion of impartial and empirical processes
can help to subvert impressions of individualized bias and refocus the sentencing process on the
offender's conduct and the characteristics that are most relevant to determining the risk to the
community that they may pose.").
72. Hannah-Moffat, supra note 9, at 276.
73. See Monahan & Skeem, supra note 28, at 4-8 (discussing the adoption of risk and needs
assessments in the criminal sanctioning systems of Pennsylvania, Virginia, and Utah).
74. Jennifer L. Skeem & John Monahan, Current Directions in Violence Risk Assessment,
20 CURRENT DIRECTIONS PSYCHOL. SCI. 38, 39 (2011).
75. Michael H. Fogel, Violence Risk Assessment Evaluation: Practices and Procedures, in
HANDBOOK OF VIOLENCE RISK ASSESSMENT AND TREATMENT: NEW APPROACHES FOR FORENSIC
MENTAL HEALTH PROFESSIONALS 41, 57 (Joel T. Andrade ed., 2009).
76. Stephen D. Hart & David J. Cooke, Another Look at the (lm-)Precision of Individual
Risk Estimates Made Using Actuarial Risk Assessment Instruments, 31 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 81, 81
(2013).
77. Mamie E. Rice et al., Validation of and Revision to the VRA G and SORA G: The Violence
Risk Appraisal Guide-Revised (VRA G-R), 25 PSYCHOL. ASSESSMENT 951, 953 (2013).
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Table 1. VRAG Scoring Sheet"8
Criminal history score for Age at index offense:
nonviolent offenses prior to -5 = 39 or over
index offense: -2 = 34-38
-2 = score 0 -1 = 28-33
0 = score I or 2 0=27
3 = score 3 or above 2 = 26 or less
Failure on prior conditional Lived with biological parents to
release: age 16:
0 = no -2 = yes
3 = yes 3 = no
Victim injury: Marital status:
-2 = death -2 = ever married
0 = hospitalized I = never married
1 = treated and released
2 = none or slight
Any female victim: Elementary school
-1= yes maladjustment:
1 =no -1 = no problems
2 = slight or moderate problems
5 = severe problems
Meets DSM criteria for any History of alcohol problems (by
personality disorder: count):
- Parental alcoholism
-2 = no
3 = yes Teenage alcoholproblemyeAdult alcoholproblem
* Alcohol involved in index offense
* Alcohol involved in prior offense
-1 - no boxes checked
0 = 1 or 2 boxes checked
I = 3 boxes checked
2 = 4 or 5 boxes checked
78. VERNON L. QUINSEY ET AL., VIOLENT OFFENDERS: APPRAISING AND MANAGING RISK
237-38 (1998). The Psychopathy Checklist is a multifactor psychological assessment used to rate
psychopathy. The DSM is the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders.
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Meets DSM criteria for Psychopathy Checklist score:
schizophrenia: -5 = 4 or under
-3 = yes -3 = 5-9
1 =no -1 = 10-14
0 = 15-24
4 = 25-34
12 = 35 or higher
Static-99 is the most widely used actuarial instrument to predict sexual
recidivism.7 9 The word "static" in the title highlights that the instrument
depends on static, not dynamic, factors, while the "99" merely signifies the
year-1999-the scale was introduced.80 Static-99 was created using four
different samples."s The first three samples were composed of sex offenders
released from Canadian institutions: two samples were discharged from
secure psychiatric institutions and one sample comprised offenders released
from a maximum security prison.8 2 The fourth included a sample of sex
offenders released from a prison in England. 3 Table 2 provides the Static-99
scoring sheet.
79. Daniel J. Neller & Giovanni Petris, Sexually Violent Predators: Toward Reasonable
Estimates of Recidivism Base Rates, 31 BEHAV. Sci. & L. 429, 432 (2013); see also Astrid
Rossegger et al., Current Obstacles in Replicating Risk Assessment Findings: A Systematic
Review of Commonly UsedActuarial Instruments, 31 BEHAV. Sci. & L. 154, 155 (2013).
80. R. Karl Hanson & David Thornton, Improving Risk Assessments for Sex Offenders: A
Comparison of Three Actuarial Scales, 24 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 119, 122 (2000).
81. Id.
82. Id. at 123-24.
83. Id. A revision in the newer Static-99R creates additional categories for the age variable
and new proportion tables, though the original version remains the popular version in use today.
Leslie Helmus et al., Absolute Recidivism Rates Predicted by Static-99R and Static-2002R Sex
Offender Risk Assessment Tools Vary Across Samples: A Meta-Analysis, 39 CRIM. JUST. &
BEHAV. 1148, 1150 (2012); Rebecca E. Swinbume Romine et al., Predicting Reoffense for
Community-Based Sexual Offenders: An Analysis of 30 Years of Data, 24 SEXUAL ABUSE 501
(2012).
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Table 2. Static-99 Scoring Sheet 84
Number ofprior sex offenses: Age at assessment:
0 = none 0 = 25 years or older
1 = 1-2 charges or 1 conviction 1 = between 18 and 25 years
2 = 3-5 charges or 2-3 convictions
3 = 6 or more charges or 4
convictions
Any convictions for a non-contact Having lived with an age-
sexual offense: appropriate intimate partner
0 = no for 2 years:
1= yes 0 = yes
1 = no
Any convictions for an index non- Any nonfamilial victims:
sexual violence: 0 = no
0 = no 1 =yes
1 = yes
Any convictions for non-sexual Any stranger victims:
violence before index offense: 0 = no
0 = no 1 = yes
1 = yes
Number ofprior sentencing dates: Any male victims:
0 = 3 or less 0 = no
1 = 4 or more I =yes
Together, the VRAG and Static-99 remain the favored vehicles for
statistics-derived predictions for violent and sexual reoffending. The present
and potential future of the mathematical model of actuarial sentencing has
now been established and explained. The next Section begins a critical
analysis and these two instruments are a focal point.
84. Hanson & Thornton, supra note 80, app. at 133-34.
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III. JUDGING EMPIRICAL VALIDITY
Predictions about an individual defendant's level of risk might well be
envisaged as an essential consideration for criminal sentencing in modem
society. Policymakers, judges, and scholars staunchly promote actuarial
assessments as best practices, representing the appropriate use of science in
the law.8" Notwithstanding the groundswell of support, there are strong
reasons to question whether statistical risk models are adequately established
for their use in such a critical area of criminal law as sentencing and
punishment. The potential specter of unreliable science in the law calls for an
analytical inquiry. Although actuarial evidence has been admitted in
sentencing matters across the country to date, justice should not remain blind
to its own potential errors in judgment. This Section outlines a variety of
troubling issues-evidentiary, empirical, and pragmatic-with the use of
actuarial assessments of risk in sentencing proceedings.
At its core, the introduction of actuarial assessment results in sentencing
proceedings is an evidentiary matter. Certainly, the quality of evidence
introduced in the law carries foundational importance.
In our adversary system, the truth-seeking rationality goal of the
rule of law forms the basis for evidentiary rules. The basic idea is
that the methodologies of the justice system should have truth-
generating capacity-a notion of due process. A second
consequence of the aspiration to rationality is a concern for accurate
evidentiary input: in order to reach a justifiable decision, courts
must base reasoning on trustworthy information. A third
consequence is that even trustworthy facts must have some logical
tendency to prove or disprove an issue in the case. This framework
for justice is the inspiration for the rules of evidence, and a
fundamental tenet is that only facts having relevance-rational
probative value-should be admissible in the search for truth.86
Notably, risk assessment results do not represent merely ordinary
circumstantial evidence about a defendant's potential future behavior.
Whether introduced through the testimony of a forensic clinician or via a
presentence investigation report written by a probation officer, risk
assessments are acting as, and accepted as, a form of expert evidence. Even
though most probation officers would not likely be qualified as expert
witnesses in forensic mental health evaluations, much less in actuarial risk
assessment technologies, their scoring individual defendants on actuarial
85. Redding, supra note 36, at 2-3.
86. Erica Beecher-Monas, The Epistemology of Prediction: Future Dangerousness
Testimony and Intellectual Due Process, 60 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 353, 356-57 (2003).
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tools and deriving results fundamentally are being understood as grounded in
the scientific method. Thus, it is appropriate to consider whether the actuarial
risk tools for violent and sexual recidivism meet the high legal standards
required for their admission as expert evidence. The initial question in this
adventure concerns the relevance of the information.
A. Fitness
A primary hurdle for the introduction of any evidence in a legal
proceeding is one of relevance. Also known as fitness, relevance requires that
the proffered evidence should assist the trier of fact in understanding a fact at
issue in the case.87 Proponents of evidence-based sentencing advocate the use
of actuarial risk tools as instructive for the utilitarian functions of sentencing.
They presume that actuarial results are relevant to a factual determination of
the individual defendant's future potential to cause harm. Unfortunately, such
a premise may be nafve, even inimical to the interests of justice. For several
reasons, the data and other information that current actuarial tools provide
appear to be a poor fit for such purposes.
First, even promoters of evidence-based sentencing acknowledge that a
key question is: measuring "the risk of what?"88 Major goals of evidence-
based sentencing practices include the ability to detect low risk defendants
deserving short prison terms or potentially diverting them to community
sanctions, while at the same time to sort out high risk defendants where
preventive incapacitation might be justifiable. Presumably, the idea of risk
for this purpose is not some unitary characteristic focused solely on an
abstract likelihood of antisocial behavior sometime in the distant future.
Instead, at least five different dimensions of risk are conceivably pertinent.
Probability is one of them, but it may not even be as important as the other
four. The additional dimensions of risk include imminence of antisocial acts,
type of offense (e.g., violent/sexual/other, contact/noncontact,
victim/victimless, child/adult victim), severity of harm, and frequency and
duration of offending. 9
In contrast to this more relevant multidimensional perspective on risk,
developers of risk assessment tools generally have addressed only two
dimensions. Many instruments count any illegal act, though the ones
addressed more specifically herein at least differentiate violent and/or sexual
recidivism from more general offending. Otherwise, the instruments tend to
87. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm. Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 591 (1993).
88. Hyatt, Reform, supra note 3, at 743.
89. Fogel, supra note 75, at 43.
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operationalize recidivism as a simple dichotomous measure. Actuarial tool
developers tally one recidivist as soon as any individual in the developmental
sample committed a qualifying act during the period of observation.9" Thus,
actuarial tools likely count identically these two hypothesized individuals: (1)
the sample subject who immediately upon release began a long-term crime
spree involving heinous violent or sexual offenses which caused significant
harm to a variety of victims, and (2) another sample subject who once
attempted a noncontact sexual offense a decade after release. But when risk
is a basis in a decision for preventive detention or probationary release, the
important matters are the probability of some future harm and an
understanding of the magnitude of the potential harm.9 1 Clearly, the danger
caused by these two hypothetical offenders is quantitatively and qualitatively
disparate. Actuarial tools usually fail to differentiate. VRAG and Static-99,
the popular risk tools highlighted herein, do not.92 In sum, currently available
risk tools are uninformative about much of what preferably should be a
multifaceted picture of risk.
Second, the goal of identifying low risk offenders cannot, including from
a scientific standpoint, be informed by current actuarial risk assessments.
These tools have not directly, or even indirectly, been developed or modeled
to detect non-recidivists or to predict desistance from reoffending. 93 Instead,
developers generally have tested and chosen factors that were positively
correlated with future recidivism.94
Pragmatically, it makes sense that risk tool developers have focused upon
factors that can forecast recidivism rather than non-recidivism because
violent and sexual recidivism are, contrary to popular belief, low rate events,
except in extraordinarily high risk populations. 95 A fixation on positively
predicting recidivism helps explain the absence in static risk tools of variables
that would potentially be predictive of non-recidivism, such as dynamic
factors (e.g., treatment successes, alcohol/drug abstinence, prosocial
contacts), circumstantial factors (e.g., loss of opportunity, community
services), or idiosyncratic variables (e.g., physically debilitating injury).
Further, risk tools typically include a relatively small number of variables,
thereby omitting a plethora of potential explanatory or correlative factors.
90. Scales use differing definitions for recidivism, such as convictions, arrests,
probation/parole violations, or self-reports. Instruments may or may not limit recidivism to
serious types (such as felonies).
91. Christopher Slobogin, Prevention as the Primary Goal of Sentencing: The Modern Case
for Indeterminate Dispositions in Criminal Cases, 48 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1127, 1135 (2011).
92. See Rice et al., supra note 77, at 951; Rossegger et al., supra note 79, at 155.
93. Craig & Beech, supra note 41, at 206.
94. Id.
95. See infra notes 158-62 and accompanying text.
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Actually, the questions scored in the final models often constitute variables
of convenience, items that evaluators will likely be able to score from
available institutional or public files. 96 Thus, many individuals assessed in a
purportedly "low risk" grouping may simply fall there because the tool used
lacks those statistically significant factors that are otherwise relevant to them.
Notice from Tables 1 and 2, for instance, that each of VRAG and Static-99,
respectively, includes variables found to statistically correlate with violence
recidivism that the other omits.
The third issue of fitness for sentencing decisions is specific to actuarial
tools utilizing risk bins. Risk bins often classify groups in an ordinal ranking
and use categorical labels; designations of low, moderate, and high risk are
commonplace. 97 Yet these categorizations are meaningless except as a rather
crude ranking system. Clinicians have no commonly agreed definition of risk
categories,98 statisticians have no accepted metric, 99 and there are no
normative legal distinctions for such labels. 10 The categorical risk bin
technique is merely a comparative and rhetorical device to differentiate the
accumulation of risk factors amongst members of the relevant developmental
sample. One particular study highlights this concept. Researchers scored a
sample of sex offenders using five standard violence and sexual recidivism
actuarial tools and found disparate uses of high and low risk labels. 10 The
authors of the study explain:
[W]hen we attempted to identify sub-samples of high and low risk
offenders using the [five] instruments, common sub-samples were
not identified. An alarmingly high number (55% of the sample)
were identified by at least one instrument as being high risk; an
alarmingly small proportion of the sample (3% and 4%,
respectively) was identified as either high or low risk by all [five]
instruments. 102
Thus, these categorical labels have only relative meaning-not absolute
value. This limitation is often ignored. Indeed, the use of such labels can have
96. QUINSEY ET AL., supra note 78, at 143.
97. J.C. Oleson et al., Training to See Risk: Measuring the Accuracy of Clinical and
Actuarial Risk Assessments Among Federal Probation Officers, 75 FED. PROBATION 52, 53
(2011).
98. See Daniel J. Neller & Richard 1. Frederick, Classification Accuracy of Actuarial Risk
Assessment Instruments, 31 BEHAV. Sci. & L. 141, 142 (2013).
99. Jay P. Singh et al., Rates of Sexual Recidivism in High Risk Sex Offenders: A Meta-
Analysis of 10,422 Participants, 7 SEXUAL OFFENDER TREATMENT 1, 183-84 (2012).
100. J.C. Oleson et al., supra note 97, at 55.
101. Howard E. Barbaree et al., Different Actuarial Risk Measures Produce Different Risk
Rankingsfor Sexual Offenders, 18 SEXUAL ABUSE 423, 429-31 (2006).
102. Id. at 437.
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particularly problematic consequences in the law. A risk assessment could
inappropriately subsume the standard of proof in law. If the decisionmaker
presumes a label of "high risk" equates to meeting the burden of a "more
likely than not" standard, the risk tool unfortunately appropriates the ultimate
issue.103 It is troublesome as well if the sentencer equates a score designated
as "low risk" as being sufficient evidence under a preponderance of evidence
standard to justify a less punitive or non-incarcerative sentence.
Fourth, actuarial tools are relatively unhelpful in the decision as to whether
a defendant's sentence should include any period of incarceration. No
standard or agreement, formally or informally, exists on the appropriate
cutoff threshold for such a yes/no decision. Should the threshold for a
decision on incarceration be linked only to a risk bin with a 100% estimated
recidivism rate, or, more plausibly, is the threshold lower, such as 50% or
20%?104 Or is a 5% probability reasonably sufficient to trigger a sentence
involving incarceration? One might suggest the categorical rankings of, say,
low, moderate, and high risk, could be useful in a jurisdiction with a policy
of incarcerating only those at high risk. But, again, considering these labels
have little meaning other than to rank order subgroups based on the
developmental sample, reliance upon them for determining the need for
incarceration remains a dubious lark at best.
Fifth, assuming the decisionmaker determines that a term of imprisonment
is necessary, actuarial results fail to, directly or indirectly, assist in
understanding how the length of a prison sentence will impact the risk of
recidivism the tool projects.10 5 Suggest the defendant's actuarial score is
matched with a risk bin in which 25% sexually reoffended. This number
provides no data about what length of incarceration would be helpful to
prevent the hypothetical future crime from occurring. It bears mentioning,
too, that proponents of the preventive incapacitation argument often lose
sight of the fact that imprisonment is not entirely successful in preventing
reoffending as prisoners commit crimes in prison (victimization of fellow
prisoners and staff is not uncommon) or from prison (inmates have found
ways to victimize the outside public). 10 6 In any event, by using actuarial
103. Daniel A. Krauss & Nicholas Scurich, Risk Assessment in the Law: Legal Admissibility,
Scientific Validity, and Some Disparities Between Research and Practice, 31 BEHAV. Sci. & L.
215, 226 (2013).
104. Roffey & Kaliski, supra note 64, at 229.
105. Starr, supra note 30, at 3 ("For example, if a judge is deciding between a one-year and
a two-year prison sentence for a minor drug dealer, it is not very helpful to know that the
defendant's characteristics predict a 'high' recidivism risk, absent additional information that tells
the judge how much the additional year in prison will reduce (or increase) that risk.").
106. See Nancy Wolff et al., Sexual Violence Inside Prisons: Rates of Victimization, 83 J.
URB. HEALTH 835, 835 (2006); Rhonda Cook, Inmates Extort Money from Outside Prison,
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scores to justify imprisonment at all, the scheme also tends to ignore the
potential that such an outcome may be further endangering public safety since
incarceration is itself often criminogenic. 107
Alternatively, a plausible argument could be made that the information
actuarial instruments is capable of providing is, in any event, unnecessary and
improperly invades the province of the factfinder. Recidivism actuarial
models rely heavily upon variables involving criminal history, prior social
maladjustments, poor family relationships, and mental disorders. 108 Is it that
unlikely that awareness of the existence of a relationship between those
factors and future antisocial behavior is beyond the ken of judges and jurors?
In sum, actuarial risk tools for the assessment of violent and sexual
recidivism appear to be poor fits to answer factual issues about future
dangerousness in sentencing. This argument may not yet be convincing
inasmuch as perceptions of future risk tend to be commonplace
considerations in sentencing matters. Many supporters of risk tools concede
some of these weaknesses yet still contend that at least the information
obtained from actuarial scoring is better than nothing at all."0 9 Consider these
issues of fitness, though, along with the criticisms that follow regarding the
failure of actuarial risk tools to comply with other prerequisites for expert
evidence.
B. Validity & Reliability
A separate fundamental requirement for the admissibility of evidence in
the law is that the information be sufficiently trustworthy, which, critically
for expert evidence, requires that it be valid and reliable.110 According to
Supreme Court doctrine, for purposes of legal evidence, validity asks "does
the principle support what it purports to show?" while reliability asks "does
application of the principle produce consistent results?"11'
AJC.cOM (Jan. 1, 2013), http://www.ajc.com/news/news/inmates-extort-money-from-outside-
prison/nTj4L/.
107. See generally Martin H. Pritikin, Is Prison Increasing Crime?, 2008 Wis. L. REV. 1049;
Lynne M. Vieraitis et al., The Criminogenic Effects of Imprisonment: Evidence from State Panel
Data, 1974-2002, 6 CRIMINOLOGY & PUB. POL'Y 589 (2007).
108. Oleson, supra note 29, at 1399 app.
109. See Oleson, supra note 29, at 1397; M. Neil Browne & Ronda R. Harrison-Spoerl,
Putting Expert Testimony in its Epistemological Place: What Predictions of Dangerousness in
Court Can Teach Us, 91 MARQ. L. REV. 1119, 1211 (2008).
110. See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm. Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 592 (1993).
111. Id. at 590 n.9.
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1. Predictive Validity
In regards to actuarial assessments of future events, the requirement of
validity is often expressed in the field of forensic sciences in terms of
predictive validity. I2 A form of psychometrics, predictive validity represents
the ability of the tool to accurately foresee the outcome of interest
occurring." 3 Two empirical measures typify predictive validity: calibration
and discrimination." 4 Calibration refers to the consistency between
predictions and observed outcomes." 5 A well-calibrated tool for recidivism
risk is one in which the average predicted recidivism rate is relatively equal
to the actual rate of recidivism." 6 For example, a tool is well-calibrated if it
predicts that 10% of persons classified in the moderate risk group will
recidivate if the actual observed recidivism rate of the moderate risk group is
about 10%. Discrimination determines how well a tool can differentiate those
who experienced the outcome of interest from those who did not.' For
violence risk tools, if those who recidivated with a violent offense all were
scored at higher risk levels than those who did not, the tool discriminates
perfectly. A high degree of discrimination does not require, or even signify,
a well-calibrated instrument." 8 Thus, a scale can achieve a high rating for
discrimination even when the average predicted risk of violent re-offense is
significantly different than the actual percentage of violent recidivists." 9
a. Discrimination
Despite the importance that a measurement of calibration should have on
the acceptability of the tool to inform significant legal decisions, the relevant
literature and discussion amongst experts have resorted to preferentially
highlighting statistical results of discrimination tests in judging the
competency of recidivism risk tools. This myopic focus on discrimination is
empirically unsound and has likely led many proponents to overestimate the
value of the current violence and sexual recidivism risk instruments. This
assertion will be further explained, along with providing measures of
112. See, e.g., Jay P. Singh, Predictive Validity Performance Indicators in Violence Risk
Assessment. A Methodological Primer, 31 BEHAV. Sci. & L. 8, 8 (2013).
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. N. Tollenaar & P.G.M. van der Heijden, Which Method Predicts Recidivism Best?: A
Comparison of Statistical, Machine Learning and Data Mining Predictive Models, 176 J. ROYAL
STAT. Soc'Y 565, 569 (2012).
116. See Nancy R. Cook, Use and Misuse of the Receiver Operating Characteristic Curve in
Risk Prediction, 115 CIRCULATION 928, 928 (2007).
117. Tollenaar & van der Heijden, supra note 115, at 569.
118. See Cook, supra note 116, at 928.
119. See id.
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calibration, after an exploration of the levels of discrimination produced by
the popular risk instruments.
Several statistical measures of discrimination for actuarial tools are
available, yet one of them in particular has come to dominate the relevant
literature. The discrimination indictor of popular choice is called the "area
under the curve" ("AUC"), which is a fraction obtained from the receiver
operating characteristic ("ROC") curve.12 0 In scientific terms, the ROC curve
is the "plot of the true positive rate (sensitivity) against the false positive rate
(1-specificity) for every possible cut-off threshold.' 2' Originally developed
in the communication sciences, the ROC curve essentially is used to
distinguish signal and noise.122 Its utility is to display true positives (i.e., the
signals) against false positives (i.e., the noise). 23 The ROC curve is a
graphical representation. 24 The AUC is a fraction providing a statistical
measurement of the ROC curve. 25 AUC values lie between 0 and 1, with .5
indicating discriminatory ability no better than chance and 1 indicating
perfect discrimination. 26 As perfection is impossible to attain when
forecasting human behavior, and actuarial tools would presumably not be
published without achieving some statistically significant level of predictive
ability, AUC values for recidivism risk tools typically lie somewhere in
between .5 and 1.127
The correct interpretation of the AUC (for a recidivism risk tool) is "the
probability that a randomly selected individual who committed an [act of
recidivism] ... received a higher risk classification than a randomly selected
individual who did not" reoffend.I28 An AUC of .90, as an illustration, means
that if one randomly chooses a recidivist and a non-recidivist, the recidivist's
actuarial score would be higher than the non-recidivist's score about 90% of
the time.'29 AUC fractions achieved by popular violence and sexual
120. Paul R. Falzer, Valuing Structured Professional Judgment: Predictive Validity,
Decision-Making, and the Clinical-Actuarial Conflict, 31 BEHAV. Sci. & L. 40, 43 (2013). Since
its introduction in 1994, ROC testing is the dominant predictive validity diagnostic in violence
risk assessment. Id. at 44.
121. Singh et al., Systematic Review, supra note 40, at 64.
122. Diler Aslan & Sverre Sandberg, Simple Statistics in Diagnostic Tests, 26 J. MED.
BIOCHEMISTRY 309, 311 (2007).
123. Id.
124. Id. at 311 fig.2.
125. Martin Rettenberger et al., Prospective Actuarial Risk Assessment: A Comparison of
Five Risk Assessment Instruments in Different Sexual Offender Subtypes, 54 INT'L J. OFFENDER
THERAPY & COMP. CRIMINOLOGY 169, 176 (2010).
126. Id.
127. See id.
128. Singh et al., Systematic Review, supra note 40, at 64.
129. Christopher T. Lowenkamp et al., The Federal Post Conviction Risk Assessment
(PCRA): A Construction and Validation Study, 10 PSYCHOL. SERVICES 87, 92 n.11 (2013).
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recidivism risk assessment tools vary by validation study and sample, but
they commonly are reported in the range of .70 to .75. 1 30 Hence, these risk
instruments have been able to classify violent and sexual recidivists at higher
levels of risk than non-recidivists about 70 to 75% of the time.
Authors of studies investigating the discrimination ability of the popular
recidivism risk tools often hype AUCS in the range of.70-.75 as representing
moderate or large effect sizes."' An effect size is a generic term to represent
the statistical magnitude of the phenomenon studied. 3 2 Yet these categorical
descriptions are far more about improvement on chance than a clear
barometer of statistical or practical significance. 33 In this area of statistics,
there is no consensus on which numeric AUC scores represent small,
moderate, or even large effect sizes. A comparative analysis of AUC effect
sizes may be of interest. Authors reviewing a variety of violence risk
assessment studies found great inconsistencies in reporting possible
benchmarks for determining small, moderate, or large AUCs, even amongst
studies citing the same sources. 3 4 In sum, the labeling of the discrimination
ability of an actuarial tool as low or high is merely a social construct that is
not only contested within the forensic science field, it does not itself offer
sufficient evidence about the predictive ability of the tool.
Clearly, AUCs in the range of .70 to .75 offer discrimination abilities
statistically better than chance (AUC of .50). But are they undeniable
evidence of the predictive ability of actuarial risk tools sufficient for legal
decisions which can have stark consequences to individuals and the public?
A variety of empirical and practical reasons exist to conclude in the negative.
Even with AUCs in that range, studies are showing a not insignificant
occurrence of mistaken rankings. Erroneous rank ordering, then, occurs
often, perhaps 25 to 30% of the time.
The AUC offers a rather limited perspective of predictive competence. To
be clear, it is imperative for anyone using AUC as a diagnostic indicator to
understand what the AUC-value does not represent: it is not an accuracy index
in terms of correctly predicting the actual occurrence of the outcome of
interest; it does not signify the probability that individuals are scored
correctly; nor does a high AUC score indicate the potential that a person
assessed with a high test score will eventually become a recidivist. 35 Equally
130. Singh et al., Metaregression, supra note 14, at 503.
131. Hanson & Thornton, supra note 80, at 129.
132. Ken Kelley & Kristopher J. Preacher, On Effect Size, 17 PSYCHOL. METHODS 137, 140
(2012).
133. Id. at 138-39.
134. Singh et al., Systematic Review, supra note 40, at 64.
135. Cook, supra note 116, at 928.
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important, the AUC statistic provides absolutely no information on the
accuracy of any individual prediction as it is exclusively a group level
statistic. 136 Instead, the AUC is simply an index of discrimination; it measures
the tool's ability to rank order cases in the aggregate. An AUC can be far
above .50 even if the tool is not well-calibrated (e.g., the percentage of
predicted outcomes is significantly different than the proportion of actual
outcomes). 137 Hence, it does not vouch for the tool's experience table of
probabilities.
The exaggeration by many enthusiasts of risk tools in overemphasizing
the AUC is partly due to its enigmatic character. This statistic is an inherently
difficult concept. Alarmingly, evidence suggests even scientists conducting
empirical tests of the predictive validity of recidivism risk tools often provide
erroneous definitions of the AUCs calculated within their own studies.'38
136. Nilsson et al., supra note 37.
137. Falzer, supra note 120, at 46. The following is an example of an instrument with poor
calibration and perfect discrimination:
If all recidivists in a sample had a risk of 10% (as calculated by the instrument
to be validated) and all nonrecidivists a risk of 9%, the AUC value of the
instrument in question would be 1 (= perfect discrimination), as in all the
pairwise comparisons the recidivists would have a higher risk of reoffending
than the nonrecidivists. However, the assessment of the risk of reoffending
would be poor, because a recidivism rate of 100% is not to be expected for a
group for which the calculated risk was 10%. Furthermore, the difference
between a risk of 9% and 10% would be too small to be of importance in daily
practice and would most likely be disregarded.
Astrid Rosegger et al., Risk Assessment Instruments in Repeat Offending: The Usefulness of
FOTRES, 55 INT'L J. OFFENDER THERAPY & COMP. CRIMINOLOGY 716, 717 (2011).
Another example of the potential practical insignificance of a discrimination index is conjectured:
In a prospective cohort that is considered generally low risk, such as many
population-based cohorts, there may be a small proportion of individuals who
are at high risk, with a preponderance of those at low or very low risk. Rank-
based measures such as the [AUC] statistic do not take this distribution into
account. Differences between [two] individuals who are at very low risk (eg,
1.0% versus 1.1%) have the same impact on the [AUC] statistic as [two]
individuals who are at moderate versus high risk (eg, 5% versus 20%) if their
differences in rank are the same.
Cook, supra note 116, at 929. A more rational reflection on AUC scores notes that "though the
ratings or scores of violent persons are, on average, higher than those of non-violent persons (so
that the probability of violence increases as the score increases), the score distributions of violent
and non-violent individuals overlap considerably." Mossman, supra note 34, at 34. Such overlap
means that even if risk tools achieve some success in rank ordering overall, this measurement of
discrimination is weak evidence of its ability to correctly distinguish recidivists versus non-
recidivists.
138. Singh et al., Systematic Review, supra note 40, at 64 (finding erroneous AUC
interpretations such as proportion of individuals who committed an antisocial act who received
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One final observation about overreliance on a discrimination measure of
predictive ability precedes an exploration of the more important measure of
calibration. Authors of a meta-analysis have shown that all the prominent
violence and sexual risk tools tend to achieve similar AUCs, even after
controlling for differences in study design and random effects. 13 9 A
commentator has referred to the common discrimination effect size as the
"dodo bird verdict," meaning that each tool may have some minimal value,
but none practically more than the other.1 40 A suggested explanation for
common discrimination effect sizes is the tendency among the recidivism risk
tools to tap common historical factors, such as prior antisocial behaviors and
poor socialization skills. 141 Moreover, experts contend that there is a natural
limit to predicting human behavior and that actuarial technologies for
recidivism risk have likely reached that limit already. 142
b. Calibration
Calibration statistics arguably offer a superior benchmark for evaluating
an actuarial instrument's predictive ability. 143 Calibration values exemplify a
reliability dimension of the scale as well. 44 One of the major differences in
the tests for calibration and discrimination is that discrimination measures
ignore base rates, which is the frequency of a given outcome in the population
of interest.145 If 10% of a sample of sexual offenders were arrested for a new
sexual offense within the period of observation, 10% would be the base rate
of sexual recidivism for that sample. AUC measures ignore base rates. The
AUC may be similar across samples with significantly different base rates as
long as the instrument does an equivalent job of rank ordering. For instance,
the VRAG was based on developmental samples with a combined 31%
higher risk scores than individuals who did not; proportion judged to be at high risk who
committed an antisocial act; proportion whose outcome was correctly predicted; and probability
a risk prediction would be accurate).
139. Min Yang et al., The Efficacy of Violence Prediction: A Meta-Analytic Comparison of
Nine Risk Assessment Tools, 136 PSYCHOL. BULL. 740, 759 (2010).
140. Pamela R. Blair et al., Is there an Allegiance Effect for Assessment Instruments?:
Actuarial Risk Assessment as an Exemplar, 15 CLINICAL PSYCHOL. 346, 348 (2008).
141. Jeremy W. Coid et al., Most Items in Structured Risk Assessment Instruments Do Not
Predict Violence, 22 J. FORENSIC PSYCHIATRY & PSYCHOL. 3, 13-14 (2011); Yang et al., supra
note 139.
142. Monahan & Skeem, supra note 28.
143. For a contrary analysis from the creators of VRAG, see generally Grant T. Harris &
Marnie E. Rice, Bayes and Base Rates: What Is an Informative Prior for Actuarial Violence Risk
Assessment?, 31 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 103 (2013).
144. Ewout W. Steyerberg et al., Assessing the Performance of Prediction Models": A
Framework for Traditional and Novel Measures, 21 EPIDEMIOLOGY 128, 129 (2010).
145. Beecher-Monas, supra note 86, at 390 n.201.
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violent recidivism base rate. Replication studies may achieve a high AUC
even if the base rates of the replication samples were significantly higher or
lower than 31%. Thus, the fact that replication studies may achieve AUCs in
the range of .70 to .75 on very different samples (diverse jurisdictions,
offender types, followup periods, type of recidivism, etc.) does not reflect
that the same base rate of reoffending is consistent throughout. In fact, as will
be shown later, base rates fluctuate greatly across different groups. Again,
relative agreement on AUCs for the same risk tool just signifies some
achievement on its rank ordering system.
Only very recently have a few researchers focused on computing and
reporting calibration statistics for the most popular violent and sexual
recidivism actuarial tools. This Article adds to this small body of research by
calculating a few additional statistics which can be used to evaluate the
predictive validity of the two most popular risk tools used today for violent
and sexual recidivism. Calibration statistics are founded upon the calculation
of a variety of measures, in the Bayesian probability tradition, 46 as listed and
defined in Table 3.
146. See generally Andreas Mokros et al., Assessment ofRiskfor Violent Recidivism Through
Multivariate Bayesian Classification, 16 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & L. 418 (2010).
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Table 3. Measures of Discrimination and Calibration
Measure ]Definition
Sensitivity The proportion of recidivists correctly predicted to
I recidivate.
Specificity I The proportion of non-recidivists correctly predicted
I not to recidivate.
True Positive Rate The proportion of recidivists correctly predicted to
recidivate. Also known as sensitivity.
False Positive Rate The proportion of non-recidivists who had been
predicted to recidivate. It is the reciprocal of
specificity (1-specificity). Also known as false alarms
and false positive predictions.
Positive Predictive The proportion of people predicted to recidivate who
Value were observed to recidivate.
Negative Predictive The proportion of people predicted not to recidivate
Value who are not observed to have recidivated.
Number Needed to The number of individuals judged to be at high risk
Detain who need to be detained in order to prevent a single
incident of violence or sexual offense in the
community.
Number Safely The number of individuals judged to be at low risk
Discharged who could be discharged prior to a single incident of
violence or sexual offense in the community.
Unlike the discrimination index, calibration is concerned with the ability
of the instrument to predict the actual occurrence of the outcome of interest.
Here, the relevant outcome is a recidivist act involving violence or a sexual
crime, depending on the instrument. Despite the earlier observation that
sentencing decisions likely are interested in various dimensions of
recidivism, current actuarial tools generally measure recidivism in a
dichotomous manner. With this limitation, then, calibration measures
consider the tool's predictive accuracy with respect to recidivism versus non-
recidivism.
The calculation measures in Table 3 require the use of a cut-off point in
which we designate all those scoring at or above the specified cut-off point
as predicted to recidivate and all those below the cut-off point are predicted
not to recidivate.147 We then compare these to the number of recidivsts versus
non-recidivists observed in the relevant sample using a 2 x 2 contingency
table as illustrated in Table 4.
147. Singh, supra note 112, at 10.
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Table 4. 2 x 2 Contingency Table
Outcome
Recidivist Non-Recidivist
Predicted to
Recidivate
Not Predicted
to Recidivate
0
E_ Sensitivity
Positive Predictive
Value
Negative Predictive
Value
Specificity
Table 5 contains calibration statistics calculated on the VRAG normed
samples, while Table 6 provides calibration statistics calculated using data
from the original Static-99 normed samples.
Table 5. VRAG (7-year followup)
Bin n r P TPR FPR PPV NPV NND NSD
1 11 0 .00 100% 100% 31% 100% --
2 70 6 .08 100% 97% 32% 100% 1 13
3 99 12 .12 97% 82% 35% 93% 2 9
4 117 20 .17 91% 62% 40% 90% 2 7
5 111 39 .35 80% 39% 49% 87% 2 5
6 95 42 .44 60% 22% 56% 81% 2 4
7 72 40 .55 39% 9% 65% 76% 3 3
8 34 26 .76 18% 2% 81% 72% 6 3
9 9 9 1.00 5% 0% 100% 70% 22 0
True False
Positives Positives
False True Negatives
Negatives
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Table 6. Static-99 (10-year followup)
Bin N r P TPR FPR PPV NPV NND NSD
0 107 12 .11 100% 100% 22% 100% 5 --
1 150 11 .07 95% 89% 23% 89% 4 8
2 204 27 .13 90% 73% 25% 91% 4 10
3 206 29 .14 79% 52% 29% 89% 3 8
4 190 59 .31 66% 31% 37% 88% 3 7
5 100 38 .38 41% 16% 42% 84% 2 5
6 129 58 .44 25% 8% 45% 82% 2 4
Legend: n = number in bin; r = number recidivated; p = proportion
recidivated; TPR = true positive rate (sensitivity); FPR = false positive
rate; PPV = positive predictive value; NPV = negative predictive value;
NND = number needed to detain; NSD = number safely discharged; -- is
used when there was a 0 in the denominator or nominator. NND and NSD
numbers have been rounded up as it is not possible to either detain or
discharge a fraction of a person.
To provide context for the tables, we can articulate some of the results.
Let us first address VRAG. Assume a cut-off score of 7 as it is commonly
designated as the beginning of the contrived "high risk" category. At the cut-
off score of 7, sensitivity is 39% and specificity (1-FPR) is 91%, meaning we
can expect that 39% of recidivists to be accurately predicted as recidivists
and 91% of non-recidivists to be accurately classified as non-recidivists. The
FPR indicates that of the non-recidivists, 9% were falsely predicted to
recidivate. At a cut-off of 7, the PPV means that 65% of offenders in the
development samples predicted to have reoffended were detected to have
reoffended, while 35% predicted to reoffend did not. Thus, the prediction that
anyone scoring in risk bin 7 or above would violently reoffend would be
wrong 35% of the time. The NPV means that if we predicted that anyone
scoring below 7 would not reoffend, we would be right 76% of the time. On
the other hand, 24% of recidivists would have been missed.
It is important to be cognizant of the differences between sensitivity and
specificity, on the one hand, and PPV and NPV, on the other. Sensitivity and
specificity are retrospective in nature; the measures observe the recidivist and
non-recidivist groups, respectively, and calculate the percentage that had
been predicted to have recidivated or not recidivated, respectively. Sensitivity
and specificity are calculated as the columns in the 2 x 2 contingency table
(see Table 4). In contrast, the PPV and NPV are base rate dependent and are
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prospective in nature; the measures consider the groups predicted to
recidivate and those not predicted to recidivate, respectively, and calculate
the percentage that actually did relapse or did not, respectively. The PPV and
NPV are calculated in the rows of the contingency table. Arguably, the PPV
and NPV are the more important measures. For one, unlike sensitivity and
specificity, PPV and NPV are calibration devices that account for differences
in the base rates. For another, in sentencing we are more concerned with
whether the actuarial instruments are sufficiently reliable to provide evidence
in decisions based on predictions offuture risk, and such decisions obviously
occur prior to that outcome actually occurring. Sentencing, then, is
prospective in nature in its relapse analysis. Consequently, the prospective
true and false prediction measures appear more pertinent. The NND and NSD
data points are also prospectively oriented.
Returning to the example of VRAG with a cut-off of 7, we find that the
NND is three, which means that three individuals in VRAG's risk bin 7 and
above would need to be detained in order to prevent a single incident of
violence from occurring in the community. In contrast, the NSD of three
means that three individuals with scores less than 7 could be discharged prior
to a single violent incident occurring in the community. The NND and NSD
represent moral constructs. One who is sympathetic to the number needed to
detain criterion is in favor of detaining that number of offenders in preference
for public safety, despite the fact that more individuals than necessary will be
effected. In contrast, an NSD adherent would likely believe that detaining too
many is unnecessary and injudicious, such that we should seek to release as
many as possible to protect civil rights.148 The NND and NSD are useful
barometers in terms of making it even clearer that all of these statistical
measures of discrimination and calibration do not exemplify objective
numbers divorced from moral choices and ethical consequences. As an
illustration, the authors of VRAG interestingly have asserted that "it can be
reasonable for public policy to operate on the basis that a miss (e.g., failing
to detain a violent recidivist beforehand) is twice as costly as a false alarm
(e.g., detaining a violent offender who would not commit yet another violent
offense).' Others may at least as reasonably disagree on civil rights
grounds and propose a contrasting perspective on the appropriate weighting
of false positives and negatives.
The foregoing provided an articulation of the numbers in the VRAG table
at just one cut-off point for illustration purposes. There are trade-offs for any
chosen cut-off. A higher risk bin as the trigger would likely decrease the true
148. Id.
149. Harris & Rice, supra note 143, at 106.
47:0001]
ARIZONA STATE LA WJOURNAL
positive rate, false positive rate, negative predictive value, the number needed
to detain, and number safely discharged, while increasing the positive
predictive value. Using a lower risk bin would have the opposite effects. The
choice is also a moral and ethical one depending on whether one is more
concerned with hits or misses.
Formulating a few exemplary statistics from the Static-99 grid in Table 6
may be helpful. If one is more concerned with protecting the public by
reducing false negatives, then a lower risk bin would suffice. At risk bin 1,
11% of recidivists would have been missed (using NPV), while at bin 6, 18%
would have been missed. If one is more interested in reducing false positives,
then a higher risk bin would be of interest. In Static-99, using risk bin 0, 78%
of predicted recidivists would have been false, whereas at risk bin 6, the
likelihood of false positives is reduced to 55%. Still, risk bin 6 is the top
category in Static-99, meaning that of those designated as high risk, half did
not recidivate sexually. Static-99 produces a significant number of false
positive predictions at its best.
Two issues should be obvious from these worked examples. The first is
the significant degree of error rates with these risk scales. The second is the
trade-offs that must be made. Not even the most conservative proponent is
likely to opt to use preventive detention on the entire sample just to prevent
any false negative. At the same time, the most liberal decisionmaker will
presumably not advocate for the release of all just to eliminate the chance of
incarcerating one false positive. Judgment calls are necessary as to where to
weigh false positives and false negatives acceptably.
Tables 5 and 6 used the experience tables in the development samples for
those identified scales. One may wonder if the meaningful failure rates for
correct predictions are unique to the development samples. Perhaps the
instruments perform better in the field? Other research has not supported this
possibility. A meta-analysis of VRAG and Static-99 replication studies using
new samples shows that at the deemed "high risk" cutoffs of 7 and 6,
respectively, the average PPVs were 66% and 33%, respectively, meaning
four out often false positives with VRAG and seven out often false positives
for Static-99 in the high risk bins. 50 The alternative violent and sexual
recidivism tools do not appear to perform any better. ' 5'
150. Singh et al., Metaregression, supra note 14, at 507 tbl.4.
151. Seena Fazel et al., Use of Risk Assessment Instruments to Predict Violence and
Antisocial Behaviour in 73 Samples Involving 24,827 People: Systematic Review and Meta-
Analysis, 345 BRIT. MED. J. 1, 10 tbl.3 (2012) (reporting averages from meta-analysis averages in
sexual recidivism tool studies: sensitivity (88%), specificity (34%), PPV (23%), NPV (93%),
NND (5), and NSD (14); and for violent recidivism: sensitivity (92%), specificity (36%), PPV
(41%), NPV (91%), NND (2), and NSD (10)).
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At least one advocate of actuarial tools in sentencing derides concerns with
false positives. Judge Marcus refers to the false positive critique as a
"thinking error" and "propaganda seeking to disparage the use of prison" for
incapacitation purposes.'52 As for the "thinking error," he posits an example
of a risk assessment tool identifying an offender as "presenting a 30% risk of
violent recidivism. That only three of ten ... will, in fact, commit a new
violent crime within the contemplated period does not yield seven 'false
positives.' The assessment of risk is by definition (in this hypothetical)
precisely accurate."' 5 3 Yet it is difficult to deny the existence of false
positives. By incapacitating the ten offenders, seven will, by his own
proposal, be unnecessarily impacted. He analogizes the scenario to an
unexploded landmine.I54 Such a comparison also appears inapposite. At least
with the unexploded landmine, the object is correctly singled out, the
dangerous property is known rather than hypothesized, and incapacitating the
landmine (presumably by dismantling or exploding it under controlled
conditions) does not constitute an infringement on constitutional rights. A
landmine is not a human being and enjoys no civil rights.
The next turn is to address the generalizability of empirical risk tools,
though the discussion about predictive ability estimates will necessarily carry
through the discourse.
2. Generalizability
Significant issues exist with any presumption that a recidivism assessment
tool is generalizable outside of the tool's developmental samples. Human
behavior is not only difficult to predict as a general matter, criminal acts and
their correlates can vary dramatically across groups, times, geographies,
environments, and circumstances. 5 ' Further, recidivism risk tools have
generally incorporated variables found to be associated with reoffending;
researchers did not intend to prove causation. The final variables are not,
then, shown to be causal to human behavior. Therefore, the factors that were
observed to correlate with recidivism in the developmental samples may not
replicate to other groups, to other times, etc. "[T]here is no way to tell in the
development sample how much of the observed relation between the
variables and recidivism is due to underlying associations that will be shared
in new samples and how much is due to unique characteristics of the
152. Marcus, supra note 19, at 754-56.
153. Id. at 754.
154. Id. at 755.
155. Keith Soothill, Sex Offender Recidivism, 39 CRIME & JUST. 145, 176 (2010).
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development sample."' 5 6 For these reasons, professional ethics require cross-
validations before any risk assessment tool is used on any new group.' 57 The
following provides a good summary of suggested types of cross-validating
factors:
[T]he predictive efficacies of all tools must be eventually subjected
to repeated empirical validation with client groups that differ in
demographic characteristics (e.g., age, gender, socioeconomic
status, ethnicity), level and type of past violence (e.g., criminal
histories, sexual vs. nonsexual offenders), psychiatric diagnosis
(e.g., presence of personality disorder, psychosis), intervention
received (e.g., treated vs. untreated), the specific criterion being
predicted (e.g., violent vs. nonviolent behavior or different types of
violent behavior), environmental setting (e.g., clients residing in
institutions vs. the community), countries of origin of the research,
and so forth.'58
As a result, prior to utilizing a risk tool on any group or individual, the
evaluator's initial question should be whether the developmental sample(s) is
sufficiently representative of the present group or individual to be examined.
It may well not be. For instance, recall that VRAG's normative groups
entirely comprised patients discharged from a maximum-security mental
health hospital in Canada. Of the developmental samples totaling about six
hundred, over two hundred had been adjudicated not guilty by reason of
insanity and another one hundred were diagnosed psychotics. 5 9 The VRAG
tool developers concede their intent was to create a risk instrument designed
to assess serious offenders likely to have mental health problems in order for
counseling professionals to craft appropriate psychiatric patient treatments. 60
Static-99 was also reliant upon significant percentages of forensic psychiatric
patients in their developmental samples.' 6' This means that the normed
samples from these popular tools possessed quite unique group
characteristics (e.g., significant numbers of mental disorders and mental
health institutionalizations) that are quite unlikely to be shared by many other
groups or in other settings. Plus, with these tools' developmental samples
156. Vincent et al., supra note 33, at 81.
157. STANDARDS FOR EDUCATIONAL AND PSYCHOLOGICAL TESTING § 3.10 (Am. Educ.
Research Ass'n, Am. Psychological Ass'n & Nat'l Council on Measurement in Educ. 1999).
158. Yang et al., supra note 139, at 741. Local validation is important, too, as predictive
variables of recidivism in ajurisdiction with abundant support services may vary from predictive
measures in a jurisdiction without. Monahan & Skeem, supra note 28.
159. Rice et al., supra note 77, at 953.
160. QUINSEY ET AL., supra note 78, at 144.
161. Hanson & Thornton, supra note 80, at 122-23.
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being entirely Canadian and United Kingdom offenders,'62 they are unlikely
to be representative of any group of routine sentencing defendants in the
United States. Studies explicitly addressing the issue of differences between
countries regularly find that the discrimination ability of actuarial recidivism
risk tools for violence and sexual reoffending tends to be lower with samples
in the United States as compared to samples in Canada'63 and the United
Kingdom. '64
The lack of representativeness renders the practice of reusing the
proportionate estimates of recidivism from the developmental samples (the
experience tables) a particularly egregious practice as a result. If the new
group is not similar to the developmental sample, the developmental sample
is not a representative reference for the individual to be assessed, or the base
rates significantly differ, adopting such estimates is specious. 1
65
Some studies purport to have cross-validated and upheld the use of the
popular recidivism tools on new samples by accentuating that the study found
a large effect size for the AUC. 166 Yet, recall that this statistic tells only part
of the story about predictive ability. The AUC merely indicates if the
instrument's relative ranking of risk conveys some degree of validity, not
whether the probability of recidivism remains the same as compared to the
developmental sample.' 67 Thus, a critical aspect to judging the desirability of
relying upon any risk tool's experience table is to either validate that the
observed recidivism rates in the new sample appropriately replicates or, in
the very likely case that it does not, to either decline to use the tool or perhaps
to replace it with one appropriately normed to the new group. Unfortunately,
neither option often occurs in practice, whether in clinical settings on in legal
contexts.
The fundamental requirements for appropriately and ethically using an
actuarial risk tool in real world situations are not merely hypothetical,
theoretical constructs. Studies frequently show that base rates of violent and
162. Id. at 122.
163. Yang et al., supra note 139, at 754.
164. R. Karl Hanson & Kelly E. Morton-Bourgon, The Accuracy of Recidivism Risk
Assessments for Sexual Offenders: A Meta-Analysis of 118 Prediction Studies, 2 t PSYCHOL.
ASSESSMENT 1, 7 (2009) (reporting meta-analysis findings of AUCs for Static-99 in samples in
the United Kingdom were much higher (average .90) than for U.S. samples (average .60)).
165. Vincent et al., supra note 33, at 81; Nicholas Scurich & Richard S. John, A Bayesian
Approach to the Group Versus Individual Prediction Controversy in Actuarial Risk Assessment,
36 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 237,238 (2012) (Asserting actuarial tools "should only be employed on
reference classes similar to those on which such instruments are normed. Applying instruments
to different samples/populations is likely to render such estimates spurious.") (citation omitted).
166. See generally Hanson & Morton-Bourgon, supra note 164; Rice et al., supra note 77.
167. Vincent et al., supra note 33, at 82.
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sexual offending vary dramatically across samples."'6 This diversity in base
rates underscores that actuarial tools which are developed on relatively small
and potentially exceptional samples are unlikely to be representative, at least
without local cross validation for both discrimination and calibration
purposes. It is also important to recognize that criminal offending, violent and
sexual offending in particular, is a cultural construct and the incidence and
characteristics of crime can be experienced in quite disparate ways in
different times, places, and circumstances.
In any event, VRAG's base rate for violent offending was 31% (at seven
years) while Static-99's original base rate for sexual offending was 21%
percent (at ten years). 169 There is overwhelming evidence that these numbers
do not reflect representative base rates outside those samples, and that they
are in most cases outliers. A recent meta-analysis of twenty-eight samples
and over 6000 subjects, including significant numbers of psychiatric patients,
in various countries found an overall recidivism rate for violence (broadly
defined) of 25%.17 ° Another meta-analysis of studies around the world
reported an average recidivism rate for violent crimes of 20%, and an
observed sexual recidivism rate of 12%.'1' Researchers reviewing multiple
studies acknowledge the wide variation in sexual recidivism rates, observing
that the summary statistic is "often in the 10% to 15% range."' 72
Local studies in the United States have found the sexual recidivism rate
varying from 3 to 35%, though the upper end appears to be an outlier as it
involved a presumably very high risk group in that the sample consisted of
offenders being evaluated for sexual predator civil commitment.173 Another
168. See sources cited supra note 156, 157 and accompanying text.
169. Mark E. Hastings et al., Predictive and Incremental Validity of the Violence Risk
Appraisal Guide Scores with Male and Female Jail Inmates, 23 PSYCHOL. ASSESSMENT 174, 179
(2011).
170. Yang et al., supra note 139, at 748 (ranging from 5 to 100%); see also Singh et al.,
Metaregression, supra note 14, at 506 (reporting meta-analysis overall recidivism rate of
approximately 31%, inclusive of violent and nonviolent reoffending from 88 independent samples
(n>5000), a large portion of which were psychiatric patients).
171. Hanson & Morton-Bourgon, supra note 164, at 6 (basing average for sexual/violent
recidivism on 50 samples (n= 17,42 1), and sexual recidivism on 100 samples (n=28,757).
172. Helmus et al., supra note 83, at 1149 (citations omitted).
173. JILL S. LEVENSON & RYAN T. SHIELDS, SEX OFFENDER RISK AND RECIDIVISM IN
FLORIDA 2, 8 tbl.3 (2012) (finding from a sample of 500 sex offenders released from Florida
prisons rearrested for a sex crime a rate of 6% in five years and 14% percent after ten years and
chronicling sexual recidivism rates of 4% and 7% in South Carolina; 7% and 13% in Minnesota;
and 4% and 8% in New Jersey for 5 and 10 years, respectively); Marcus T. Boccaccini et al.,
Field Validity of the Static-99 and MnSOST-R Among Sex Offenders Evaluated for Civil
Commitment as Sexually Violent Predators, 15 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & L. 278, 291 (2009)
(finding recidivism rates for Texas sex offenders significantly lower than original and
redeveloped STATIC-99 norms); Helmus et al., supra note 83, at 1149, 1154 tbl.1; Romine et al.,
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meta-analysis yields interesting results. It combined studies of eight risk tools
(including VRAG and Static-99), focusing on sexual recidivism rates for the
groups that the instruments judged to represent "high risk" of sexual
recidivism. The overall mean rate of sexual recidivism for those judged to be
at high risk was 33%, with a range of 2 to 75%. 174 The meta-analysis authors
concluded:
One of the assumptions of these instruments is that groups classed
as high risk will sexually recidivate at similar rates when sample
size, time at risk, and setting are taken into consideration. The
findings of the present study suggest that this assumption may not
be evidence-based and that recidivism rates amongst those judged
to be at high risk vary considerably both within and between
instruments. 17
5
Perhaps some worked examples will assist in conceptualizing the
significance of base rate differences in altering predictive accuracy. I
computed the positive predictive values of VRAG (Table 7) and Static-99
(Table 8) using lower base rates ("BR") than their developmental samples
considering that most studies have tallied smaller rates of recidivism.
Table 7. VRAG Base Rate Change Impacts
PPV with PPV with PPV with
Risk Bin BR of 31% BR of 20% BR of 10%
1 31% 20% 10%
2 32% 20% 10%
3 35% 23% 12%
4 40% 27% 14%
5 49% 34% 19%
6 56% 41% 23%
7 65% 51% 31%
8 81% 71% 52%
9 100% 100% 100%
supra note 83, at 504, 506 tbl. 1 (finding sexual recidivism rate of 14% (4% noncontact) in
community sample of 744 Minnesota offenders).
174. Jay P. Singh et al., Rates of Sexual Recidivism in High Risk Sex Offenders: A Meta-
Analysis of 10,422 Participants, 7 SEXUAL OFFENDER TREATMENT 1, 6 (2012) (noting average
follow-up of 81.4 months).
175. Id.
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Table 8. Static-99 Base Rate Change Impacts
PPV with PPV with PPV with
Risk Bin BR of 21% BR of 10% BR of 5%
0 22% 10% 5%
1 23% 11% 5%
2 25% 12% 6%
3 29% 14% 7%
4 37% 19% 10%
5 42% 23% 12%
6 45% 25% 13%
The second column in each table uses the base rate in the applicable
instrument's development samples and, therefore, represents the tool's
original experience table. I posited lower new base rates for Static-99 than
VRAG as sexual recidivism occurs less frequently than violent recidivism
(violent recidivism instruments often count sexual recidivism, as does
VRAG). Let us use as an example VRAG's risk bin 7 (commonly deemed
the "high risk" cutoff) where we predict that all offenders scored in risk bin
7 and above would recidivate. With the original base rate of 31%, the positive
predictive value was 65%, meaning that of those scoring 7 and above
predicted to violent recidivate, 65% did. This correspondingly represents that
35% would have been false positive predictions. Notice the significant drop
in PPV statistics when the base rate declines. Using the same cut-off score of
7, the PPV declines from 65% to 51% and 31% with base rates of 20% and
10%, respectively. Thus, with a sample in which the base rate is 10%, using
VRAG with a 7 cut-off score, 69% (seven out of ten) would represent false
predictions of recidivism.
The loss in predictive value when positing more realistic sexual recidivism
base rates with Static-99 is equally as dramatic. Using the top risk bin of 6 as
representing "high risk" (according to the developers), the developmental
samples' base rate yielded a positive predictive value of 45%. Lowering the
base rates to 10% and 5% yielded PPVs of 25% and 13%, respectively.
Hence, in a new sample in which the sexual recidivism rate is 5%, correct
predictions of sexual recidivism using Static-99's highest bin, 87% would be
false positive predictions. The use of 5% here is not just to make a point. It
personifies a realistic sexual recidivism percentage. Conducting the most
recent nationally representative sample to date, the Department of Justice
tracked almost 10,000 sexual offenders released from prisons in the United
AD VENTURES IN RISK
States in 1994 and calculated a sexual recidivism rate of 5% (at three
years).17 6
The Static-99 developers have issued a revision, Static-99R, 77 with a new
normed group which they call routine offenders, with a base rate of 6%. 178
One might then argue that if there is a revision with an updated experience
table representing a more realistic base rate, evaluators should just use it as
more likely representing a valid tool. The Static-99 developers actually do
now suggest that Static-99R norms should replace the original. Nonetheless,
the Static-99R's calibration index remains weak. At its best (at risk bin 9),
the revised instrument earns a PPV of 33%, meaning two-thirds would be
false positive predictions. 179
As a result of deviations in base rates and sample composition, researchers
commonly report concerning levels of diversity of the performance of risk
tools. 180 As an example, a recent meta-analysis of studies using Static-99R
found that the instrument performed disparately. 8' Across studies, the
predicted recidivism rate for a Static-99R score of 0 varied from 0 and 19%
(weighted average 5%), a score of 2 varied between 0 and 36% (weighted
average of 9%), and score of 5 varied between 1 and 62% (weighted average
of 18%).182 The authors concluded that the predicted base rate fluctuations
were likely due to the various impacts of disparities in "cohort effects (i.e.,
year of release), country, recidivism criteria, quality of recidivism
information, offender type, or treatment participation" and the "density of
unmeasured risk factors external to Static-99R."'83 The same meta-analysis
found great variability from an alternative perspective. The underlying
studies associated a predicted five-year sexual recidivism rate of 15% with
Static-99R scores ranging from two to eight. 84
Overall, then, the rather unconvincing calibration statistics produced
herein provide confirming evidence that actuarial risk tools are too unreliable
176. PATRICK A. LANGAN ET AL., U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, RECIDIVISM OF SEX OFFENDERS
RELEASED FROM PRISON IN 1994, at 1 (2003), available at http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/
content/pub/pdf/rsorp94.pdf.
177. Romine et al., supra note 83, at 502-03.
178. Singh et al., supra note 174.
179. See Static-99R, Observed and Estimated 5 Year Sexual Recidivism Rates for Static-99R:
Routine Sample, STATIC99 (Nov. 15, 2009),
http://www.static99.org/pdfdocs/detailed-recid-tables-static99r_2009-11-15.pdf (using fixed
follow up).
180. See, e.g., Helmus et al., supra note 83, at 1157.
181. Id.
182. Helmus et al., supra note 83, at 1164 (weighted averages reported in the text from fixed
effects models).
183. Id.
184. Id.
47:0001]
ARIZONA STATE LA W JOURNAL
for the purposes of critical criminal law decisions. This opinion is not meant
as an indictment of the use in a legal context of VRAG and Static-99
exclusively. Similar issues in predictive ability would generally apply to the
other currently available actuarial risk technologies. Concernedly, weak
predictive ability plagues risk instruments that were validated on local
samples. For example, the Virginia sexual offender recidivism tool used in
its sentencing scheme yields a PPV of 57% at five years and 64% at ten years
at the state's suggested cut-off point.1 5 Hence, it produces about 40% false
positives at the state's own official cut-off point. The most recent revision to
Minnesota's sexual recidivism instrument (Mn-SOST 3.1) performs even
worse: PPVs of 20% and 16% in its top 10% and 15% ranking categories,
respectively, leaving 80% false positive predictions at the highest risk
levels. 116 In sum, even though these instruments appear to correct the
generalizability issue at least with respect to a geographic limitation, the great
degree of false positives, four out of ten for Virginia and eight out of ten for
Minnesota, reflect the tendency toward exceptional error rates. 187
The gist of the evidence outlined herein is that the violent and sexual
recidivism actuarial instruments appear unsound for use in routine sentencing
cases in the United States. The immediate discussion pointed out issues with
generalizability and what may be perceived as extreme error rates. So far the
analysis has focused on the fit, validity, and reliability of actuarial risk
instruments and drew on empirical and logical issues that should provide
pause for their use in legal proceedings. The next issue to be addressed is the
widespread misuse and erroneous interpretations of the abilities of risk
assessments based on actuarial models.
C. Group-Based Statistics: The G2i Problem
Reliance upon actuarial tools to inform legal judgments presents an
interpretive quandary that has been nicknamed "G2i."'' l The G2i problem
185. See VA. CRIMINAL SENTENCING COMM'N, ASSESSING RISK AMONG SEX OFFENDERS IN
VIRGINIA 89 fig.3 (2001), available at http://www.vcsc.
virginia.gov/sex off report.pdf for PPV calculation data. Cutoff-point is 28 points. Id. at 92. The
Virginia tool counts as recidivism any misdemeanor or felony crime against a person. Id. at 52.
186. See MINN. DEP'T OF CORR., THE MINNESOTA SEX OFFENDER SCREENING TOOL-3.1
(MNSOST-3.1): AN UPDATE TO THE MNSOST-3, at 20 tbl.3 (2012), available at
http://www.doc.state.mn.us/pages/files/large-files/Publications/MnSOST3- 1 DOCReport.pdf for
PPV calculation data. This tool counts as recidivism reconvictions of hands-on sexual crimes. Id.
at 9.
187. See VA. CRIMINAL SENTENCING COMM'N, supra note 185, at 19-20.
188. David L. Faigman et al., Group to Individual (G2i) Inference in Scientific Expert
Testimony, 81 U. CHI. L. REV. 417, 417-18 (2014).
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represents a basic disconnect between the scientific method, which operates
by studying at the group level, and the law, which focuses on the individual
case.'89 Translating from the population, being the group level-the "G" in
G2i-to the individual case-the "i" in G2i-is a precarious adventure
fraught with errors; but many judges, practitioners, even forensic assessors,
fail to notice. 90
Immanently, actuarial risk tools are scientifically designed at the
aggregate level. Actuarial tools are not case studies focused on individuals,
nor are they intended to incorporate idiosyncratic traits or qualities of any
single person.' 9' Whereas developers of actuarial instruments often choose
factors that show statistically significant correlations or, alternatively, are
statistically significant in regression models, rarely occurring variables
naturally cannot achieve the requisite significance. 192 In the actuarial field for
recidivism, the nature of study has been to build models for group-based
predictions for reoffending, without attention to being able to predict which
specific individuals in the group will relapse. 93
Unlike the attention to generalizable knowledge that science pursues, legal
decisions are interested in idiosyncratic traits (to the extent considered
relevant) and in making individualized decisions. 94 Scientific studies may
properly show that young, undereducated males are significantly more likely
to commit violent acts, but in the law the prosecution must still prove beyond
a reasonable doubt that this particular young, undereducated male committed
the violent crime for which he is prosecuted. Similarly, while scientific
studies may find positive correlations between sexual recidivism and
variables regarding race/ethnicity, neighborhood, and sexual preference,
presumably in sentencing we remain interested in the prosecution's burden
to show this individual defendant poses a high risk of re-offense to justify a
longer prison sentence. 95 Otherwise, the law is merely profiling in its
criminal procedure decisions.
189. ld. at 418.
190. Id. at 420.
191. See Vincent et al., supra note 33, at 82.
192. See id.
193. Nilsson et al., supra note 37, at 403.
194. Fogel, supra note 75, at 45 (citation omitted).
195. Still, a potential difference between these situations is that adjudicating guilt is a
retrospective exercise whereas sentencing, at least to the extent it incorporates utilitarian
concerns, is forward-looking where future predictions are involved. Others argue predictions of
future behavior are always group-based thinking exercises. Eric S. Janus & Robert A. Prentky,
Forensic Use of Actuarial Risk Assessment with Sex Offenders: Accuracy, Admissibility and
Accountability, 40 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1443, 1478-79 (2003).
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A common G2i error is the presumption that group-based data allows for
predictions at the individual level. Unfortunately, there is evidence in case
law of just this sort of inaccurate attribution in sentencing proceedings. A
sentencing opinion has described Static-99 as an objective tool "to predict the
danger of future recidivism by [the defendant]." 196 Similarly, defense counsel
in another sentencing case is quoted as referring to Static-99 as "a test which
is employed and used to predict whether ... an individual poses a risk of
sexual assault to the public."'197
But if group data essentially do not permit individual predictions, one
might wonder how group-level data, i.e., nomethic data, are meant to be
applied to individual predictions, i.e., on an idiographic level. 98 G2i methods
normally operate through inferential reasoning. Usage of actuarial risk tools
in clinical and legal realms typically relies on the rhetorical device of analogy,
such as "[tlhis man resembles offenders who were likely to recidivate,
therefore he is likely to recidivate"' 99 or some form of relative risk, such as
"this offender is riskier than that offender. ' 200 Often, too, actuarial test results
are conveyed in absolute terms, such as "based on the score of x, this
defendant's risk for violent recidivism over the next y years is z percent.
20 1
Certainly, some attention is appropriate in terms of understanding which
type(s) of risk communication methods can best convey actuarial results to
fact-finders in legal cases. 20 2 For purposes of informing legal decisions on
appropriate sentences, the individualized and relatively straight forward
examples just given are likely preferred by decision-makers. Notwithstanding
such desire, these common forms of risk communication are scientifically
and logically inaccurate and unfortunately obscure the limitations of using
group-based study, which is at the core of the G2i problem.
196. United States v. Adams, No. 09-2404, 2010 U.S. App. LEXIS 13074, at *116 (3d Cir.
Feb. 11, 2010).
197. People v. Delara, No. D057180, 2011 WL 5826080, at *22 (Cal. Ct. App. Nov. 18,
2011) (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks omitted).
198. Nicholas Scurich et al., Innumeracy and Unpacking: Bridging the
Nomothetic/Idiographic Divide in Violence Risk Assessment, 36 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 548, 548
(2012).
199. Hart & Cooke, supra note 76, at 82 (emphasis omitted) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
200. R. Karl Hanson et al., Quantifying the Relative Risk of Sex Offenders: Risk Ratios for
Static-99R, 25 SEXUAL ABUSE 482, 484 (2013) (internal quotation marks omitted).
201. See Daniel J. Neller & Richard 1. Frederick, Classification Accuracy ofActuarial Risk
Assessment Instruments, 31 BEHAV. SCi. & L. 141, 141 (2013).
202. Nicholas Scurich & Richard S. John, Prescriptive Approaches to Communicating the
Risk of Violence in Actuarial Risk Assessment, 18 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & L. 50, 52 (2012).
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A cognitive error known as an ecological fallacy occurs when one
attributes a group characteristic to any individual in the group.20 3 Some
properties of a group only reside at the aggregate level. For instance,
researchers may have observed in the sample studied the occurrence of every
type of sexual offense imaginable (e.g., adult rape, statutory rape, child
molestation, bestiality, voyeurism, exhibitionism, child pornography
viewing). But no one individual in the group is likely to have committed
several of them, much less all of them. Thus, the occurrence of a wide variety
of sexual recidivism offenses is merely an aggregate statistic; it would be
fallacious to describe the study results as evidence that individuals tend not
to specialize in their sexual reoffending.
Surely, the group level statistic that actuarial recidivism tools are perhaps
most prized for is the proportional statistic tied to the relevant score or risk
bin (e.g., 52% of those who scored 6 and higher sexually reoffended).
Applying that group proportion to any individual is likewise an ecological
fallacy and deceptive. Thus, the communication of risk in absolutist terms
("this defendant is 52% likely to sexually reoffend") is perhaps the worst
offender in terms of correctly interpreting the aggregate statistics. Sentencing
proceedings unfortunately exhibit a frequent use of risk assessment tools in
just such a way. Experts in sentencing hearings have testified that a Static-99
score placed the defendant personally at "an 11% risk for sexual offense
recidivism within [ten] years,' ' °4 or meant that the defendant "presented a
33[%] chance of sexual reoffending within five years, a 52[%] chance after
ten years, and a 57[%] chance after fifteen years. '2 5 In a certification hearing
of a juvenile to the adult system for adjudication and sentencing, another
expert stated that, based on the VRAG, the juvenile defendant "presents a
48% risk (low to moderate) of recidivating in seven years and a 58% risk
(moderate to high) of recidivating in ten years. 20 6
As the last example reflects, it is regrettably common for assessors to
impose categorizations of predictive risk directly onto individual defendants.
For example, a state expert in one case testified that Static-99 "measured
[d]efendant's risk for recidivism as low moderate. 20 7 A state judge sentenced
203. Scurich et al., supra note 198, at 549.
204. State v. Barnhart, No. OT-10-032, 2011 WL 5317301, at T1 1 (Ohio Ct. App. 2011).
205. United States v. Adams, 385 Fed. Appx. 114, 116 (3d Cir. 2010).
206. In re D.L.W., No. A12-1112, 2013 Minn. App. Unpub. LEXIS 114, at *6 (Minn. Ct.
App. Feb. 11, 2013).
207. State v. Fults, No. M2004-02092-CCA-R3-CD, 2006 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 520, at
*50-51 (Tenn. Ct. App. July 7, 2006); see also State v. Seward, 289 Kan. 715, 716 (2009)
(denoting defense expert's "report stated that the Static 99 placed Seward in the medium-low risk
category, with a 16 percent chance that he would reoffend in the next 15 years"); State v. Winters,
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the defendant to a long prison term, citing the results of VRAG, which
"placed him in a high risk to re-offend."20 A presentence investigation report
in another case stated: "The results from the Static 99 test suggested [this
defendant] posed a 'high risk' for committing another sexual offense in the
future."2 09
This type of attribution affirmatively reflects the G2i problem. To be
certain, actuarial tools cannot now, or ever, technically operate as a sort of
test of an individual's propensity. The ecological fallacy is particularly salient
when the group-based study derived correlative factors that were not also
shown to be causative. The creators of recidivism risk tools have not proven
causation, in part because the tools are generally atheoretical. 210 Altogether,
then, actuarial models cannot offer what many unfortunately presume they
do, which is the ability to predict which individuals will reoffend. The
developers of Static-99 admit that the fundamental attribute of their risk tool
is not an absolute measure of risk in which the rate observed for the normed
group can be applied to the person assessed; rather they concede their risk
tool is designed to provide a relative risk measurement. 21 1
Perhaps recognizing the same G2i issues, the literature accompanying the
VRAG suggests the following form of relative risk communication in the
following exemplary excerpt of a forensic assessment report of a hypothetical
Mr. Moore: "Mr. Moore's category for risk of violent recidivism is in the
eighth, or second highest, of nine categories. Among offenders in the
[developmental] studies . . . , only four percent obtained higher scores, and
approximately eighty-two percent in Mr. Moore's category reoffended
violently within an average of 10 years after release. 21 2 This version helps
explain the use of actuarial results in the comparative form previously
suggested ("this man resembles offenders who were likely to recidivate,
therefore he is likely to recidivate"). An example of this style of relative risk
No. 5-113 /04-0575, 2005 Iowa App. LEXIS 147, at * 2-3 (Iowa Ct. App. Feb. 24, 2005) (scoring
Static-99 placed defendant in medium/high risk category).
208. State v. Gunderson, No. DC 07-0632, 2008 Mont. Dist. LEXIS 868, at *5 (Mont. Dist.
Ct. Aug. 22, 2008).
209. Guidroz v. State, No. 06-03-00239-CR, 2004 Tex. App. LEXIS 2872, at *2 (Tex. Ct.
App. Apr. 1, 2004). A probation report in another case likewise stated defendant's "score of zero
on the Static-99 assessment placed him at low risk of committing another sexual offense if
released on probation." Jati v. Long, No. SACV 12-02073 GAF (AN), 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
151048, at *46 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 13, 2013).
210. Andrew John Rawson Harris & R. Karl Hanson, Clinical, Actuarial and Dynamic Risk
Assessment of Sexual Offenders: Why do Things Keep Changing?, 16 J. SEXUAL AGGRESSION
296, 298 (2010) (conceding that with actuarial risk tools, "little attention is paid to the meaning
or clinical utility of the risk factors" included).
211. R. Karl Hanson et al., supra note 200, at 484.
212. QUINSEY ET AL., supra note 78, at 357-58 (emphasis omitted).
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communication can be found in at least one sentencing document. Scoring
the defendant on Static-99 per the judge's order, a presentence investigation
reports that the defendant "scored a [six] on this risk assessment. Individuals
with these characteristics, on average sexually reoffend at 39% over five
years, 45% over [ten] years and 52% over [fifteen] years."21 3
An analogous form of risk communication still has fostered erroneous
interpretations, as the previous example illustrates. Lamentably, some
academics are repeating this characterization that actuarial estimates provide
average recidivism rates for offenders sharing the assessed individual's
characteristics. 14 In other words, the assumption seems to be that offenders
at each score or in each bin share common characteristics or histories. To the
contrary, they may only share equivalent point totals. Because of the variety
of factors available in the tools, study subjects may have received the same
ending point totals based on completely different factors. To offer an
example, two different people may share the same score where one received
points on factors relating to criminal history, mental disorder, and trouble
with alcohol, and the other for the recidivism predictors involving choice of
victim, never being married, and young age. Thus, individuals assessed with
the same resulting scores, or combined in the same risk bins, may share none
or just a few of the same characteristics. The pair may be more dissimilar
than similar.
The third common form of communication that can misdirect the
sentencer is in the form of a relative risk assessment on a hierarchical scale
(e.g., "this offender is riskier than that offender"). Indeed, interested parties
concerned with the G2i problem suggest that a better approach is to
conceptualize actuarial risk assessment as providing assistance in
classification of different groups of offenders.2" 5 For example, an expert in
one sentencing hearing testified that the defendant "scored in the lowest risk
213. People v. Hillier, 910 N.E.2d 181, 184 (Ill. App. Ct. 2009).
214. See, e.g., Starr, supra note 30, at 806 (describing actuarial risk tools as "models [which]
provide reasonably precise estimates of the average recidivism rates for the group of offenders
sharing the defendant's characteristics." (emphasis omitted)); Beecher-Monas, supra note 86, at
410 ("The most that one can say for any actuarial risk assessment instrument is that it can give a
probabilistic estimate of the level of risk for people who share characteristics with the person
assessed.").
215. CHRISTOPHER BAIRD, NAT'L COUNCIL ON CRIME & DELINQUENCY, A QUESTION OF
EVIDENCE: A CRITIQUE OF RISK ASSESSMENT MODELS USED IN THE JUSTICE SYSTEM 3 (2009)
("Although [actuarial] models are frequently depicted as a means to predict which offenders will
reoffend, actuarial risk assessment is more appropriately described in terms of classification.
These systems simply apply group statistics to individual decisions to help agencies identify
where they should focus their resources. In essence, these tools establish base expectancy rates
for offenders who have different profiles.").
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category relative to other adult male sex offenders," '216 and a presentence
report in another case documented that, "[b]ased on the Static 99 score this
places [this defendant] in the high category or between the top 12% risk
category relative to other male sex offenders." '217 This form of risk articulation
shares the concerns just addressed for the other types of communication in
terms of inexpertly using group-level statistics to adjudge an individual's
chance of recidivating. Yet it raises another conceptual issue not yet
discussed. The relative ranking to other persons may be practically
meaningless without knowledge of the relevant base rate of recidivism. It
seems necessary when understanding a relative risk of an outcome to factor
in relative to what? If the base rate is 10%, a decision incorporating a risk
estimate presumably would be very different than if the base rate is 50%,
much less 80%.
In addition, a relative or ordinal categorical ranking may be particularly
fraught with misestimations for sexual offenders. Studies consistently show
that the public has an erroneous perception that sex offenders are highly likely
to sexually reoffend and, as a consequence, overestimate actual rates.2"8
Indeed, one study found the tendency for the public to dramatically
overestimate the recidivism rate of typical sex offenders at nearly 75%,219
despite the reality that, at least in the United States, recidivism for sexual
offenders is a small fraction of that in most studies.220 Thus, a relative or
categorical risk communication comparing the defendant as higher risk than
other sex offenders will likely yield a higher than necessary prediction.22'
The G2i problem could well be conceptualized as another problem of
fitness. The factual issue of a sentencing defendant's risk of reoffending is,
or at least should be, an individualized inquiry. Arguably, we should not be
overly interested in the average recidivism rate of the group of violent or
sexual offenders, as applicable. Instead, the issue at hand is the future risk of
the individual defendant at hand, who may vary from the average in ways not
216. United States v. Robinson, 669 F.3d 767, 770 (6th Cir. 2012) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
217. Hillier, 910 N.E.2d at 184 (internal quotation marks omitted).
218. Jorge G. Varela et al., Same Score, Different Message: Perceptions of Offender Risk
Depend on Static-99R Risk Communication Format, 38 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 418, 418(2014).
219. Timothy Fortney et al., Myths and Facts about Sexual Offenders: Implications for
Treatment and Public Policy, SEXUAL OFFENDER TREATMENT 1, 9 tbl.3 (2007); see also Stacey
Katz-Schiavone et al., Myths and Facts about Sexual Violence: Public Perceptions and
Implications for Prevention, 15 J. CRIM. JUST. & POPULAR CULTURE 291, 300 tbl.3 (2008)
(reporting 98% of survey respondents answered affirmatively that "most sex offenders reoffend").
220. See supra note 174 and accompanying text.
221. Varela et al., supra note 218, at 419.
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measured by the tool.222 The inability of group-based statistics to provide
predictions at the individual level, as just explored, make the actuarial tools
rather unsuitable to answer such factual question. Hence, the arguments made
in this Section perhaps have come full circle in a sense, yet lead to a new
perspective based on purely legal considerations of evidence law. Are
actuarial risk assessments too prejudicial, confusing, and/or misleading for
the courtroom?
IV. PREJUDICIAL IMPACT
Empirical and interpretive challenges with statistically driven assessments
plague the use of actuarial tools even in clinical environments. Concerns may
appropriately be heightened further when they are offered in a legal context,
particularly in such a critical proceeding as sentencing which necessarily
involves public safety and fundamental deprivations of liberty and privacy.
Sentencing individuals to potentially long-term periods of incarceration
based on determinations of risk deserves circumspection. To this end, a
commentator has suggested that risk assessment evidence which drives more
punitive sentences ought to be subject to a stricter legal standard for
admissibility. 23 At the same time, preferring certain defendants by reducing
their sentences due to lower risk scores from actuarial tools demands
consideration as it may cause unwarranted disparity among otherwise
similarly-situated offenders, reduce the deterrence value of punishment, and
needlessly endanger the public. Instead of caution, however, policymakers
and judges seem impressed by the guise of empiricism, and in lieu of
critiquing the fitness, validity, and reliability of risk tools, officials are more
likely to reify them. This Section offers additional cautionary tales on the use
and misuse of risk assessment results in sentencing matters.
A. Experts on Future Dangerousness
Despite multiple and significant weaknesses and misinterpretations, little
evidence exists in sentencing law of risk scales being substantively or
procedurally challenged. There exists Supreme Court precedent that
supports, at least as a threshold matter, the admissibility of expert evidence
about future dangerousness in sentencing proceedings. In the case styled
222. See, e.g., Mark S. Brodin, Behavioral Science Evidence in the Age of Daubert:
Reflections of a Skeptic, 73 U. CIN. L. REV. 867, 911 (2005) (citing cases excluding expert
testimony concerning reliability of average eyewitness as the issue is this particular eyewitness'
reliability).
223. Hannah-Moffat, supra note 9, at 286.
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Barefoot v. Estelle,224 the Supreme Court addressed the admissibility of
certain evidence in a case in which a jury sentenced a capital defendant to
death upon a finding that "there is a probability that the defendant would
commit criminal acts of violence that would constitute a continuing threat to
society. '225 Barefoot objected to the state's offer of psychiatric expert
witnesses to testify about his future dangerousness potential.2 6 His challenge
was not an evidentiary one per se, but an argument that psychiatric opinion
concerning future risk was so unreliable that this type of evidence would
produce arbitrary sentences in violation of the Eighth Amendment's Cruel
and Unusual Punishment Clause.227 Interestingly, the American Psychiatric
Association ("APA") submitted an amicus brief in support of the defendant's
position, declaring psychiatric testimony on future risk could not be reliable
and that, in the organization's estimate, two out of three predictions by
psychiatrists of long-term future dangerousness were erroneous. 2 8 Although
acknowledging the APA's position, a six-justice majority nevertheless ruled
against the defendant. 229 According to the majority, even the APA did not
n.rt thnt n,,vhintrivt. wfT re nlwnv wrnna nnd, thnogh mnnv nsvcrhintrit,
contested the reliability of such predictions, other doctors remained willing
to testify and to give their professional opinions about a defendant's future
risk of violence.23°
The Barefoot majority appeared to be concerned with a sort of contagion
effect. The majority opinion expressed disquiet about the possibility that if
expert evidence was ruled inadmissible in capital cases, the whole idea of
future dangerousness as a proper criterion in sentencing decisions generally
would be in peril.231 The Court likewise noted that since the state's capital
sentencing statute required juries to make this type of factual determination
of future risk, jurors should at least get some external assistance.232 Besides,
the majority ruled, any "shortcomings" in expert judgments about future risk
could effectively be evaluated during the adversarial process.233
The Barefoot decision is not necessarily dispositive here. Barefoot
concerned unstructured clinical judgment (understandably, as the case
preceded the development of actuarial risk tools), with the majority endorsing
224. 463 U.S. 880 (1983).
225. Id. at 884.
226. Id. at 885.
227. Id.
228. Id. at 920 (Blackmun, Brennan and Marshall, J. dissenting).
229. Id. at 906 (majority opinion).
230. Id. at 899-901.
231. Id. at 896 (precluding factfinding on future risk akin to "disinvent[ing] the wheel").
232. Id. at 896-97.
233. Id. at 899.
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the testimony of one of the psychiatric witnesses who claimed an ability to
make an expert assessment "if given enough background information." '234
This suggests the majority may have only been approving expert opinions
based on a holistic review from a comprehensive clinical evaluation. The
ruling may not extend to the far more limited review required by current
actuarial tools. Indeed, in a later decision, the Supreme Court questioned,
albeit in dicta, the reliability of an expert's opinion on future risk if it followed
merely a "cursory" review of the individual defendant and his
circumstances.235
Another reason to potentially distinguish Barefoot is on the question of the
expert's qualifications. The discussion in Section III should have given the
impression that risk assessment technologies are far from intuitive devices.
Their foundational methodologies are abstruse and evaluators face challenges
in correctly interpreting and communicating results. Christopher Slobogin is
a supporter of the use of actuarial risk technologies in the law, yet accepts
that to be qualified as an expert to render actuarial evidence, the person must
understand the underlying statistical techniques and have access to the
specialized knowledge on which the tool is founded.23 6 He rightly explains
that any potential expert witness should be able to articulate the methodology
used in constructing and validating the tool as
it is unlikely that a layperson would understand the significance of
a finding, say, that someone who belongs to a group with a base rate
for violence often percent has a forty percent chance of recidivating
within a given period of time, without some explanation of the
significance of base rates, false positives, and follow-up periods.237
The experts at issue in Barefoot, though giving clinical opinions rather
than scoring an actuarial instrument, at least were presumably well-educated
psychiatrists knowledgeable about the field of forensic mental health and
conversant in clinical risk appraisal methods. Today, many of those in the
sentencing world who are scoring and interpreting actuarial results are
evidently not so qualified. Quite likely, numerous evaluators are woefully
unqualified in the relevant areas of expertise. Regarding one such group,
multiple states now permit, even require, probation officers to routinely
include actuarial assessment results in presentence reports. 238 One might
argue that scoring an actuarial tool itself is a simple task requiring no special
skills or education. To the contrary, the tools are not easily scored, some of
234. Id. at 899 n.7.
235. Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 415 n.3 (1986).
236. Christopher Slobogin, Dangerousness and Expertise, 133 U. PA. L. REV. 97, 137 (1984).
237. Id.
238. See supra note 26.
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them require mental disorder diagnoses, and many factors necessitate
judgment calls.239 Perhaps a few examples will suffice. VRAG includes
factors such as a diagnosis of a personality disorder, a complicated
Psychopathy Checklist evaluation, and a rating for elementary school
maladjustment. All known recidivism risk tools require adjustments for a
variety of criminal history variables that often remain vaguely constructed
and defined. On the whole, insufficient attention is being paid to whether the
experts testifying in sentencing proceedings, or pseudo-testifying through a
backdoor method of incorporating risk scores and interpretations via
presentence reports, are properly qualified to score actuarial scales or to
intelligently explain the methodological attributes as Professor Slobogin
suggests.
B. Judges as Gatekeepers
A number of researchers in the mental health field now voice skepticism
about the scientific value of actuarial risk. The authors of a recent meta-
analysis of violence risk assessment tools observe that the prediction of
violence is one of the "most complex and controversial issues in the
behavioral sciences" and the significant problems and discrepancies in risk
assessment practices that their study revealed led to their conclusion that
actuarial tools should not be the sole or primary basis for criminal justice
decisions.24 ° Other experts allege that, with the base rate of violence so low,
"for the foreseeable future, no technique will be available to identify those
who will act violently that will not simultaneously identify a large number of
people who would not."'24' In addition, researchers in a separate meta-analysis
of risk assessment tool studies comment: "One implication of these findings
is that, even after 30 years of development, the view that violence, sexual, or
criminal risk can be predicted in most cases is not evidence based. '242
Should sentencing judges defer to actuarial risk as a mere policy choice or
must it be subjected to normal evidentiary standards of the law? Bernard
Harcourt laments that "[w]hat we have done, in essence, is to displace earlier
239. Oleson, supra note 29; see supra Tables 1-2.
240. Yang et al., supra note 139, at 740, 761.
241. Alec Buchanan et al., Resource Document on Psychiatric Violence Risk Assessment,
169 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 340 (2012 Supp.).
242. Fazel et al., supra note 151, at 5; see also Rettenberger et al., supra note 125, at 183
(concluding from study of actuarial tools (including Static-99): "One major aim of most criminal
justice systems is to calculate risk by predicting the probability of severe sexual crimes. This goal
obviously is not yet achieved satisfactorily by actuarial risk assessment, because results are far
from ideal" and should probably be considered only as part of a broader clinical assessment.").
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conceptions of just punishment with an actuarial optic." '24 3 The steadfast
reliance upon actuarial instruments may simply be pragmatic. The policy of
using risk tools in sentencing decisions represents a sort of "better safe than
sorry" approach 244 that elevates public safety over individual liberty,
conveying the political willingness to withstand false positives over false
negatives. The political advantage is evident as "false negatives engender
political opprobrium and false positives go virtually undetected"245 with
preventive incapacitation.
Judges are expected, though, to be apolitical and independent arbiters of
truthful evidence. They have been tasked to act as gatekeepers interested in
excluding unreliable science otherwise disguised as expert evidence.
Nonetheless, scant evidence exists of courts restricting, much less
questioning, actuarial risk assessments in sentencing proceedings. As a
general matter, rules of expert evidence are often now ignored in sentencing.
A legal commentator mourns that sentencing hearings have become "an
evidentiary free-for-all. 246 Courts in at least nineteen states have expressly
ruled that the states' evidentiary admissibility standards do not apply to
expert testimony based on structured risk assessments or, if they do apply,
most tools are deemed, with little or no review, to meet the appropriate
standard.247 Researchers reviewing the use of VRAG results in American
courts concluded, "it is clear that on whole the courts accepted the findings
of the risk assessment instruments. 248
Numerous proponents of actuarial tools in sentencing concede some of the
empirical problems, but contend that the answer is for the adversarial process
to flesh out any issues or concerns on behalf of the factfinders and/or grant
defendants access to their own professional risk experts. 249 This argument
appears consistent with the Barefoot opinion advocating that any battle be
waged in the courtroom. Yet counsel have generally been unwilling, unable,
or too enamored of the scientific cloak to use the adversarial questioning
process to critically examine risk tools, their underlying methodologies,
243. HARCOURT, supra note 11.
244. Nilsson et al., supra note 37, at 405-06.
245. Scurich & John, supra note 202, at 58.
246. Beecher-Monas, supra note 86, at 357.
247. Krauss & Scurich, supra note 103, at 220.
248. Michael J. Vitacco et al., The Role of the Violence Risk Appraisal Guide and Historical,
Clinical, Risk-20 in U.S. Courts: A Case Law Survey, 18 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & L. 361, 383
(2012).
249. Michael H. Marcus, Conversations on Evidence Based Sentencing, 1 CHAP. J. CRIM.
JUST. 61, 105 (2009); Pari McGarraugh, Up or Out: Why "Sufficiently Reliable" Statistical Risk
Assessment is Appropriate at Sentencing and Inappropriate at Parole, 97 MINN. L. REV. 1079,
1109 (2013).
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issues of generalizability, or the true meanings of the G2i interpretations
provided.250 In terms of the latter, a commentator regrets that the "near
complete failure to even mention problems of determining individual risk
from group data is, perhaps, the single greatest blot on the majority of risk
assessments presented to the courts in all jurisdictions. '251 In this respect,
perhaps it is not entirely the fault of judges for allowing in this type of
evidence. The law maintains
a requirement that evidence be cogent. This requires that the
limitations of [risk] assessments be iterated and subjected to judicial
scrutiny. Alarmingly, demonstrable limitations of risk assessments
and the instruments or techniques on which they are based are all
too often simply ignored by forensic practitioners of various
persuasions, if they are comprehended in the first place. And so the
courts are denied the very information they should be provided with
when considering the prognostications of these practitioners. This
lacuna must be remedied to prevent errors in the investigatory
processes being relied upon and hence perpetuated in the
adjudicative phase with the result that miscarriages ofjustice are all
but guaranteed to occur when preventative detention and
supervision of sexual and violent offenders are mooted.252
Two notable exceptions exist. A pair of prominent federal judges has
publicly questioned actuarial evidence of risk in sentencing proceedings.
Judge Posner of the Seventh Circuit in a written opinion chastised the litigants
for not even enquiring about the offered Static-99 evidence. 253 He further
opined that even though actuarial assessment "may be more accurate than
clinical assessments, . . . that might not be saying much. ' 25 4 Judge Jack
Weinstein of the Eastern District of New York has done a commendable job
of critically assessing Static-99, even examining the experts himself in
lengthy testimonial exchanges, citing in his written opinion numerous
forensic science publications, and listing the instrument's flaws.2 5 Among
250. Browne & Harrison-Spoerl, supra note 109, at 1211.
251. Ian R. Coyle, The Cogency of Risk Assessments, 18 PSYCHIATRY PSYCHOL. & L. 270,
274 (2011).
252. Id. at 271-72.
253. United States v. Mcllrath, 512 F.3d 421, 425 (7th Cir. 2008). Judge Posner bemoans
that the litigants not only failed to investigate the Static-99 outcome's validity as applied to the
individual defendant, they failed even at a most basic level to identify it: "We are not even told
what 'Static-99' is."Id. at 424.
254. Id. at 425. Though, even Judge Posner makes an error in conceptualizing Static-99 as
requiring a conviction to count recidivism. Id. at 425. Instead, one of the four samples
operationalized recidivism to include arrests or readmissions to the psychiatric institution. Hanson
& Thornton, supra note 80, at 123 tbl.2.
255. United States v. C.R., 792 F. Supp. 2d 343, 445-66 (E.D.N.Y. 2011).
AD VENTURES IN RISK
Judge Weinstein's astute observations are that it "is essential in using risk
assessment tools to consider the appropriateness of the population used to
create the base for assessment,1156 it is inappropriate to use a risk tool on a
defendant for whom it was not normed,257 use of the instruments may still
reflect biases of the evaluator,258 and excessive reliance upon them is a real
and serious concern.259
To be sure, the issue herein is not whether the use of risk assessment tools
for violent and sexual recidivism constitutes poor science in any holistic
sense. The standards of law and science are not synonymous. 260 The error
rates underlying risk tools may be acceptable to scientists or in clinical
settings, while at the same time too high in a legal context. 261 VRAG and
Static-99, for instance, may be completely acceptable in a mental health
situation where the results may be part of a broader clinical assessment on
which a psychologist will base a treatment plan. Or the risk scores may assist
a psychiatrist in determining which patients potentially can be safely
transferred to a less secure area of a mental health institution. The argument
here does not intend to infringe upon those experts' balancing of interests in
their own professional settings. The law can learn from, and embrace,
knowledge from the sciences, but the law also still stands on its own merits.
Particularly when the stakes are so high, an independent weighing by legal
minds should be perforce. The overall thesis, then, is that the actuarial risk
tools for violent and sexual recidivism are too unreliable for the purposes of
sentencing decisions, with the confusion about them amongst the experts
themselves as further confirmation thereof.
Importantly, some proponents argue that actuarial scores and their
corresponding rankings and/or probabilistic interpretations do not need
separately to meet legal standards of admissibility because they constitute
256. Id. at 449.
257. Id. at 446.
258. Id. at 462.
259. Id. at 461.
260. Frederick Schauer, Can Bad Science be Good Evidence? Neuroscience, Lie Detection,
and Beyond, 95 CORNELL L. REv. 1191, 1219 (2010) ("[T]he evaluative standard to be used by
the law, even when it is science that is being evaluated, must be based on law's goals, law's
purposes, and law's structures, and as is so often the case, what is good outside of law may not
be good enough inside it.").
261. id. at 1214 ("Science can tell us that a certain scientific process has, say, a 12 percent
error rate (or specific rates of Type I and Type II errors or false positives and false negatives).
And scientists must decide for their own scientific purposes whether such rates are sufficient, for
example, to assert that something is the case, conclude that a finding is adequate for publication,
or find a research program promising enough to renew a research grant. But whether such an error
rate is sufficient for a trier of fact to hear it, put someone in jail, keep someone out of jail, justify
an injunction, or award damages is not itself a scientific question.").
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just one piece of information in a multidimensional decision.2 62 This framing
appears too simplistic and dismissive. The notion that unreliable science
(even junk science) should somehow be protected because it might constitute
simply one source of information in a multi-factor decision should offend any
strong adherent to the principles of law and the desire to admit only truthful
evidence. A plethora of other independent authorities would claim to have
the knowledge and ability to predict future behavior and would honestly
assert a conviction that the foundations of those predictions lie in science and
based on reliable methods. Envision astrologists, numerologists, and palmists
who purportedly predict the future through objective and standardized means.
Consider those trained in psychology and psychiatry who have in our history
promoted prognostications of antisocial behavior founded on such
"scientific" theories as phrenology, physiognomy, and somatotypes. The
"only one piece of evidence" rationalization would admit as expert evidence
each of them.
Besides, even if actuarial risk assessment has some minimal relevant value
or represents merely a morsel of external aid to assist in complicated
decisions, an additional query should be whether it will do more harm than
good? Federal Rule of Evidence 403 states: "[t]he court may exclude relevant
evidence if its probative value is substantially outweighed by a danger of one
or more of the following: unfair prejudice, confusing the issues, [or]
misleading the jury... "263 It seems at least reasonable to conclude these risk
assessments are overly misleading, confusing, and prejudicial.
C. Science is Fallible
Information offered as expert evidence and portrayed as founded upon the
scientific method is necessarily accorded a higher status in the minds of
recipients.2 64 The use of the word "expert" deploys all of the positive and
262. E.g., Michael A. Wolff, Evidence-Based Judicial Discretion: Promoting Public Safety
Through State Sentencing Reform, 83 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1389, 1404 (2008) (framing it as informed
sentencing via risk assessment tools); see also Browne & Harrison-Spoerl, supra note 109, at
1212 (arguing judges benefit from risk assessment experts with different professional opinions);
Schauer, supra note 260, at 1205 (contending scientific evidence need not be shown reliable
beyond a reasonable doubt where it accounts for one piece of evidence in decisions on
incarceration).
263. FED. R. EVID. 403.
264. Hyatt et al., Integrate, supra note 19, at 267 ("Recent advances in the science and
statistical methodologies of prediction have allowed higher degrees of automation for actuarial
risk forecasting than ever before."); McGarraugh, supra note 249, at 1105-06 (noting actuarial
tools developed by scientists through empirical methods); Redding, supra note 36, at 4, 7 (noting
actuarial "approaches rely on empirically identifiable criminogenic risk and protective factors
and/or scientifically validated tools for assessing those factors, providing a quantifiable prediction
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superior connotations the English language has given it: "[o]ne whose special
knowledge or skill causes him to be regarded as an authority; a specialist.
265
In the law, expert testimony is given an authoritative and privileged status.
Such a perception is regrettable here. The abilities of actuarial tools can be
misleading in being draped in the guise of empiricism, with its attendant
"aura of scientific infallibility." 266 Further, the results of risk assessments here
are reified in sentencing decisions as issuing from objective calculations
completed in a scientific "test. 2 67 This conceptualization of actuarial
instrument predictions is misleading and likely accounts for the few questions
or criticisms being raised in legal cases about the significant rates of error,
critical lack of generalizability to American sentencing populations, and
erroneous interpretations of actuarial results, all as discussed herein.
"Science" has obscured what is really a matter of art. To foretell a person's
future antisocial actions, a heavy dose of imagination is intrinsically required.
The connotation of the descriptor of "scientific tests" masks both reality and
common sense, luring the audience into forgetting about the inherent
incompetence to effectively predict human behavior, especially in the long-
term.
The entirety of Section III herein should establish how actuarial
instruments and their resulting interpretive results confuse factual issues
regarding future risk. Supplemental support exists. A growing body of
research from the forensic mental health field further illustrates just how
confusing (and manipulable) communications of risk are to factfinders.
Researchers in a trio of studies found that judges and mock jurors believed
the categorical format of communication (high versus low) to be more
probative and led them to rate more offenders at higher likelihoods of
reoffending than when the risk format used numerical statistics. 268 The
of risk (stated in probability or categorical format)" and representing a "scientific assessment of
the offender's recidivism risk"); but see Margareth Etienne, Legal and Practical Implications of
Evidence-Based Sentencing by Judges, 1 CHAP. J. CRIM. JUST. 43, 60 (2009) (using actuarial risk
tools, "judges must beware of the ability of science to seduce them out of judging").
265. "Expert" Definition, OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY (2d ed. 1989), available at
www.oed.com/.
266. Jack B. Weinstein, Scientific Evidence in Complex Litigation, in ALI-ABA COURSE OF
STUDY: TRIAL EVIDENCE, CIVIL PRACTICE, AND EFFECTIVE LITIGATION TECHNIQUES IN FEDERAL
AND STATE COURTS 709, 723 (1991).
267. E.g., United States v. Zobel, 696 F.3d 558, 565 (6th Cir. 2012); United States v.
Robinson, 669 F.3d 767, 770 (6th Cir. 2012); State v. Bamhart, No. OT-10-032, 2011 WL
5317301, at 12 (Ohio Ct. App. 2011); People v. Delara, No. D057180, 2011 Cal. App. Unpub.
LEXIS 8881, at *63 (Cal. Ct. App. Nov. 18, 2011).
268. See generally Stephanie A. Evans & Karen L. Salekin, Involuntary Civil Commitment:
Communicating with the Court Regarding "Danger to Other", 38 LAw & HUM. BEHAV. 325
(2013); P.P. Kwartner et al., Judges 'Risk Communication Preferences in Riskfor Future Violence
Cases, 5 INT'L J. FORENSIC MENTAL HEALTH 185 (2006); Varela et al., supra note 218.
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finding is reminiscent of the concern previously discussed related to the
dangers posed by using amorphous categorical rankings that overtake any
sense of absolute risk estimation. Judges and jurors are confounded even
more by numerical results. A pair of studies discovered that risk estimates
given in frequencies (e.g., 5 of 10) were perceived by jurors to amount to a
greater risk of recidivism than equivalent probabilistic risk estimates (e.g.,
50%),269 which, of course, is illogical. Another study found that framing a
risk estimate as the probability of violence (e.g., 26% likely to be violent)
leads to a greater assessment of risk than when the equivalent risk estimate is
framed as the probability of no violence (e.g., 74% likely to be nonviolent),270
which is likewise incongruous. A suggested explanation for these results is
that judges and jurors have issues with innumeracy, denoting a lack of ability
with numbers,27' particularly with statistics,272 as buttressed by this body of
research.
One of those experiments just mentioned has additionally confirmed the
potential for courtroom manipulation. The researchers sought to compare
judgments when risk assessment results were packed or unpacked. Unpacked
results simply communicated the result as high risk or low risk, while packed
results included the high or low risk attribution and provided additional
contextual information to explain the relevant factors that contributed to the
evaluee's high or low risk result. When the description of a risk assessment's
high or low risk results were unpacked, study subjects were more likely to
agree with the rating of high or low risk, respectively. 273 As a consequence of
the findings, the researchers offered certain basic legal strategies: attorneys
for the government would want to unpack high-risk but not low-risk results,
while attorneys for the defendant would wish to do the opposite. 74 These
suggestions clearly play on the apparent opportunity to exploit confusion in
understanding the information that actuarial tools can provide.
A counterargument may be that judges and jurors are generally not entirely
awed by science or by expert witnesses and that they affirmatively have the
capability of critically assessing, even disregarding, expert evidence which
269. Craig & Beech, supra note 41, at 205; Paul Slovic et al., Violence Risk Assessment and
Risk Communication: The Effects of Using Actual Cases, Providing Instruction, and Employing
Probability Versus Frequency Formats, 24 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 271 (2000).
270. Nicholas Scurich & Richard S. John, The Effect of Framing Actuarial Risk Probabilities
on Involuntary Civil Commitment Decisions, 35 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 83 (2011).
271. Scurich et al., supra note 198, at 549.
272. MORRIS E. CHAFETZ, THE TYRANNY OF EXPERTS: BLOWING THE WHISTLE ON THE CULT
OF EXPERTISE 103 (1996); Joseph Sanders, The Merits of the Paternalistic Justification for
Restrictions on the Admissibility of Expert Evidence, 33 SETON HALL L. REV. 881, 906 (2003).
273. Scurich et al., supra note 198, at 551.
274. Id. at 552.
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they suspect is not up to par.275 Whatever the merit that argument may have
with other types of expert evidence, it seems unsuitable here. How can judges
or jurors possibly comprehend the abilities and flaws of actuarial instruments
when, as shown earlier, "experts" themselves are often mistaken about
them?2 7 6 Plus, any transparency offered by actuarial methods, for which they
are widely lauded, is by and large a myth. The biased focus on the
discrimination measure to judge predictive ability effectively conceals issues
of poor calibration performance and lack of generalizability. Assessment and
scoring practices, too, are clouded in secrecy. There are no suggested
guidelines or limits on what types of evidence or witnesses should be used to
gain the necessary information to score the worksheets. Evaluators often rely
on hearsay and additional evidence that would otherwise be inadmissible in
court and for which the truthfulness is unknown. Issues with the quality of
the underlying information are often ignored as actuarial results are conveyed
in an objective and mathematical manner with little enquiry into the sources
from which the data and impressions were obtained. Just ponder, if you will,
the likely sources on which evaluators base their deductions to score factors
such as elementary school maladjustment, parental alcoholism, victim injury
(VRAG), or the existence of any prior female victims of reported or
unreported assaults (Static-99).
A supplementary consideration undermines the vision that actuarial risk
assessment is simply another piece of information in a complex decision. The
potential for undue prejudice can be realized by drawing upon several
psychological constructs. One is anchoring bias, which occurs in any
decision-making process when one places too heavy a weight-the anchor-
on a single piece of information. Often the anchor is the starting point and it
can maintain an overly influential effect on the final decision, particularly in
the face of uncertainty. 277 Anchoring bias is a cognitive heuristic; when faced
with particularly complex judgments, reliance upon an anchor can be seen as
a useful mental short-cut, but it also tends to unconsciously produce
significant errors.2 78
The potential for anchoring bias to occur, and the errors in decision-
making that likely result, is evident as supporters often forthrightly advocate
that actuarial tools should dominate sentencing decisions.2 79 Thus, prejudicial
275. Sanders, supra note 272, at 907.
276. See supra note 138, 205-09 and accompanying text.
277. Singer et al., supra note 37, at 347.
278. Id.
279. N.Y. STATE DIV. OF PROB. & CORR. ALT., NEW YORK STATE PROBATION SEX OFFENDER
MANAGEMENT PRACTITIONER GUIDANCE 9 (2009) (directing probation officers that the actuarial
results ought to "anchor the judgment or impressions").
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impact occurs when the actuarial "results" potentially taint both the
evaluators and triers of fact.280 They may become biased toward the anchor-
the actuarial result-and fail to adequately reassess that anchor even in light
of contradictory information, which may be unwisely discounted.28" ' A recent
study is illuminating. Using judges as sample subjects, researchers found that
when given actuarial predictions of sexual recidivism risk, judges became
more conservative in their decisions; that is that they were more likely to
order detention than without such information.282 However, the rate of false
positives also increased as a result.
Another prejudicial effect is related to general misestimations regarding
the propensity of violent and sexual offenders to reoffend. Criminological
research typically demonstrates that the public believes that recidivism rates
of violent and sexual offenders are much higher than they are in reality.283
The psychological construct of confirmation bias is informative here,
indicating "the tendency to unwittingly select and interpret evidence in a
manner that confirms a previously held belief or hypothesis, while
minimizing or failing to recognize contrary evidence. 284 Further, cognitive
dissonance occurs when, given conflicting evidence, people tend to select that
evidence which reinforce decisions they have already made and downplay
the contrary signs.285 Thus, judges and jurors may overvalue a risk tool
prediction that confirms their preexisting inclination toward assuming high
risk.
Several studies are on point with respect to the potential bias toward
believing in high recidivism potential. Using judges and/or mock jurors in
their samples, researchers revealed that sample subjects given an actuarial
prediction of high risk were more likely to adopt that valuation and to devalue
a low risk actuarial prediction, possibly because they had a tendency to
believe violent offenders routinely are dangerous. 286 A reasonable hypothesis
is that the subjects valued opinions consistent with their hypothesis
supporting dangerousness and discounted expert information that was
280. Hart & Cooke, supra note 76, at 97.
281. Fogel, supra note 75, at 46.
282. Evans &. Salekin, supra note 268.
283. Stacey Katz-Schiavone et al., Myths and Facts About Sexual Violence: Public
Perceptions and Implications for Prevention, 15 J. CRIM. JUST. & POPULAR CULTURE 291, 299
(2008); Justin T. Pickett et al., Vulnerable Victims, Monstrous Offenders, and Unmanageable
Risk. Explaining Public Opinion on the Social Control of Sex Crime, 51 CRIMINOLOGY 729
(2013).
284. Ryan W. Scott, The Skeptic's Guide to Information Sharing at Sentencing, 2013 UTAH
L. REV. 345, 374.
285. Beecher-Monas, supra note 86, at 395-96.
286. See generally Evans &. Salekin, supra note 268; Kwartner et al., supra note 268; Varela
et al., supra note 218.
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contrary thereto as it contradicted their assumption about sex offender
recidivism.
There is confirming anecdotal evidence of sentencing judges discounting
low risk assessments.287 A sentencing judge in a particularly enlightening
exchange explicitly rejected defendant's proffer of low risk assessment from
a Static-99 scoring, describing the evidence as just "what some scientist or
some academic guru might think about the likelihood of re-offending at this
stage" and concluding: "[q]uite frankly, I don't care about Static[-]99. '2 88
Perhaps this judge is perceptive, indeed.
V. CONCLUSIONS
Risk assessment is envisioned as a progressive criminal justice policy.
Optimistically, risk-informed practices permit officials to make smarter
decisions in managing criminal populations to achieve cost-effective
solutions by reducing reliance upon imprisonment while at the same time still
protecting the public. Actuarial risk instruments are the modem face of the
new risk penology, purportedly offering objective, reliable, and empirically
validated predictions of recidivism potential. Whatever merit actuarial
assessments may have for a variety of criminal justice decisions (such as bail,
probation, and parole), they are far too problematic for use in sentencing
matters. Sentencing is a critical stage in criminal proceedings. In sentencing
adjudication, untoward and unquestioning reliance upon a potentially error-
ridden source of information undermines the standards of evidence law,
offends the principles of justice, and potentially thwarts the goals of
deterrence and reducing recidivism.
Actuarial risk tools are unfortunately reified in sentencing proceedings as
epitomizing an infallible application of scientific principles and the empirical
method. The guise of science unwittingly convinces many that actuarial
scales allow us to accurately and precisely predict the immanently
unpredictable-human behavior. The nonpartisan qualities of numbers and
statistics can be both seductive, allowing sentencers to feel that risk can be
corralled, and powerful, seemingly insulating sentencing decisions in a veil
of science. Nonetheless, the almost complete failure to question, critically
analyze, or challenge the actuarial model of sentencing has potentially
permitted unreliable science to invade sentencing law and remain undetected
as such. The naturalistic fallacy is present, whereby proponents of actuarial
287. State v. Perrine, No. 99534, 2013 Ohio App. LEXIS 5738, at *20-22 (Ohio Ct. App.
Dec. 26, 2013) (discounting Static-99 low risk score).
288. State v. Zink, No. 201 1AP2684-CR, 2012 Wis. App. LEXIS 892, at *3-4 (Wis. Ct. App.
Nov. 14, 2012).
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justice confuse what is with what ought to be. We might want, for all sorts of
justifiable and honorable reasons, to be able to objectively and reliably
differentiate likely recidivists from non-recidivists, and to sentence
accordingly. But no matter how much we wish for science to solve our
problems, current actuarial methods for predicting risk are not the panacea
advocates imply. To the extent that sentencing includes utilitarian concerns
involving future risk, science cannot save the legal system from a heavy
measure of uncertainty. Certainly, unreliable science will not be the savior.
